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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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MISSION, STRUCTURE OF ANTITANK HELICOPTER REGIMENTS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German May 82 pp 64-74

[Article by Istvan Csoboth: "Army AT Helicopter Regiments 3 Years Old"]

[Text] Mission, organization, experience. AT helicopter regiments are the most recent formations in the rather short 25-year history of German Army Aviation. They have been in existence for 3 years. Through them, army aviators for the first time become involved in army combat operations. Lt Col Istvan Csoboth, CO, 26th Army Aviation Regiment, based at Roth, near Nuernberg, the AT helicopter unit of II Corps, reports on the planning and implementation of AT defense from the air and draws conclusions as to the meaningful further development of a system which even its critics today credit with a high degree of effectiveness.

The army's 1981 large-scale maneuvers, conducted under the name of "Scharfe Klinge" [Sharp Blade], for the first time gave army aviators an opportunity to test the command organization of the new PAH-1 [AT helicopter] weapons system in a regimental context and thus to go beyond the level of experience which until then had been confined to individual half-squadrons [two flights]. PAH-1 from two squadrons were employed with two divisions. At that time 28 PAH-1, organized in four half-squadrons were available, in other words, 50 percent of the total inventory in a regiment. The commanders of all participating major formations agree unanimously that PAH is an effective and on repeated occasions also the only means against enemy tank thrusts. The helicopter was quickly available and was easily commanded in conjunction with combat troops without having any disturbing or paralyzing effects on other weapons systems. This not at all sensational result would not require any special mention if it had not been preceded by decades of dispute over AT defense using helicopters and if its implementation had not been blocked.

Since the abolition of the cavalry, there appears to have been no other discussion as controversial as the one over the introduction of the PAH into the German Army. There were probably three reasons that were decisive here:

The threat to the helicopter on a Central European theater of war which was considered to be very high;

The sheer endless delay in the decisions as to the development of this system and

The selection of the BO-105 as the PAH-1.

The employment of the helicopter in the armed forces, especially in the ground forces, began on a major scale only after World War II. Wherever this was done, there was a rear area, at least a zone safe from enemy fire. When the Americans began to use helicopters for troop transport in Korea and when the French began to do this in Indochina and later in Algeria for troop-carrying purposes in the immediate combat area and also as weapons platforms, they had control of the air and their enemies as a rule did not have any adequate AA defenses. This also applied during a long phase in the Vietnam war. It thus seemed that all critics were right in asserting that the lessons learned with helicopters in direct firefights cannot be transposed to Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces, with their powerful frontline aviation and AA defense forces, would soon turn the approach of a helicopter on the battlefield into a rather losing proposition. In combat, the helicopter would be helplessly exposed to massed AA defenses and to the fire of AA weapons, artillery, and the on-board cannon of armored combat vehicles. The large number of radar and IR target location instruments in combination with highly accurate tube and rocket weapons would turn the helicopter--which can hardly be protected in terms of design--into a victim without the slightest chance.

Advocates of the helicopter as weapons platform countered with the argument that helicopters--protected against discovery by extreme low-level flight and fighting with long-range weapons at maximum range--would be very well suited to accomplish missions which otherwise could not be accomplished or which could be accomplished only with a far greater effort. The dispute was not the end of it as such; instead, threat analyses were prepared, helicopters were equipped with existing weapons, and exercises were flown in experimental combat missions. The Army Aviation Weapons School during the early 1960's already flew Alouette-II helicopters equipped with the SS-11 guided AT rockets and tested them with rather good results. When tube weapons--on-board cannon and machine guns--were installed on a model basis, there was little success; this was due technically because the recoil forces, the ammunition supply and storage required a considerable effort and a rather heavy payload, that is to say, big helicopters, and, in addition to growing costs, necessarily also brought about reduced low-level flight capability and a greater probability of discovery; furthermore also because the helicopter's sway performance permitted point-target engagement without major stabilization efforts only at a very low hit rate; tactically, the range of the on-board weapon forced the helicopter into the radius of action of identical weapons on the ground which were much more accurate.

Such discoveries carried less weight on other theaters of war because the only important thing often was to neutralize an enemy--who was inferior in terms of weapons capable of engaging helicopters--by means of fire from automatic weapons. This is why more and more helicopter models appeared in the armed version. The Americans were the first to develop a special helicopter designed for combat during the 1960's; that was the Hueycobra AH-1G; still, this model

was very close to the Bell UH-1 series. This helicopter in the meantime has been modified several times and has been in action since 1967. The French were satisfied with arming the liaison helicopters Alouette II and later the Gazelle 341.

At the end of the 1960's and during the early 1970's, the U.S. forces financed major combat helicopter developments, specifically, the AH-56A, the Cheyenne by Lockheed and the S-67 Blackhawk by Sikorsky. These "battleships," weighing about 10 t, were technically highly complicated, tactically omnipotent--although hardly in Europe--and out of reach in terms of price even for the United States. They did not go into production.

During all these years, German Army Aviation stuck to the basic concept of specializing the helicopter for AT defense. Tanks were the primary enemy of the ground forces and it was important to create the ability for the rapid formation of points of main effort and shifting forces in order to engage those tanks and that was possible only with the help of helicopters. The threat to the helicopter was kept within justifiable limits by the type of armament and the combat method as such. The army of course was unable to implement these ideas in practice during the 1960's. Not until the beginning of the next decade, was the Air Force ready to drop its objections and to cooperate in the experimental series which began in 1972 and to start work on a tactical requirement.

The experiments begun in 1972 in Ansbach-Katterbach and taken over since 1973 by the Army Aviation Experimental Squadron in Celle step by step proved the effectiveness of the AT helicopter.

The Air Force--in the meantime a convinced partner in the experimental program--now began to argue away from specialization and toward the assumption of the entire close-in air support mission. The army however stuck to the AT defense role and was looking for new implementation possibilities. The first phase document for the development process--the tactical requirement--was at last submitted and approved in 1974. The contemplated binational development fell apart in 1975 when the aircraft industry's partner firms were unable to agree on their shares. The United States was always there as a technically powerful production cooperation partner but due to worldwide military obligations came up with engineering solutions which deviated from the German ones, that is to say, they were expensive. At that time, the AAH (Advanced Attack Helicopter) was already undergoing development. Cooperation with France was handicapped because the requirement time frame could not be coordinated and--as it turned out later--the military concepts were also basically different.

Going things alone on a national scale seemed neither financially nor politically advisable. Because the required night-time capability--low-level flight and combat--at any rate did not yet appear feasible for the next several years, it was at last decided in December 1975 to solve the problem by carrying out the tactical requirement by the middle of the 1980's through international cooperation (PAH-2); the time gap until then was to be bridged by converting the Boelkow BO-105-M, which was already available as VBH (liaison

and observation helicopter) into the PAH-1. The HOT [high subsonic, optical system, tube-launched] weapons system of the Jaguar 1 rocket TD had to be adapted as the armament for this helicopter. The PAH-1 of course was unable to meet the tactical requirement on several points but seemed to be suitable to serve the army into the 1960's to boost its AT defenses where the forces of the combat units would not suffice even after reorganization into Army Organizational Structure 4.

This decision had been considered feasible without technological and financial risk by 1978.

The fact that the delivery of the PAH-1 to the regiments did not begin until 1980 and will not end before 1984 may have many administrative as well as economic and budget policy reasons; but in the final analysis, this is after all the end result of a development process which is characterized by a dispute over authority, by different interests advanced by different users and suppliers, and by decisions that were postponed again and again. The army was years ahead of the rest of the world in design terms with the idea of specializing a helicopter for AT defense but was unable to express the innovative value of this concept in engineering terms. The armament sector and industry must accept the reproach that they pursued solution ideas which were aimed more at that which was technically feasible rather than that which was tactically necessary at a very minimum. This unfortunately still applies today to the PAH-2 where time has been wasted since 1976 without any results. AT defense from helicopters is possible only so long as the relatively unprotected weapons platform cannot be engaged by the enemy or can be engaged by him only with disproportionate difficulty either through flight maneuvers and through the performance characteristics of its weapons. Today this can be achieved by means of a covered approach flight and departure, by parking under the protection of natural and artificial ground cover, and by engaging the enemy from ranges beyond the range of enemy weapons. To the extent that enemy detection sensors and helicopter defense weapons are perfected, the effectiveness of the PAH will of course decline. This kind of development has already been launched. The time during which the PAH can meaningfully supplement combat operations against armored forces must be utilized. The decades of delay in the implementation phase constitutes a waste of resources.

The PAH-1 Weapons System

Speed: 200 km/hr; endurance: 1.5 hr plus reserve; combat load: six HOT guided AT rockets; maximum range: 4,000 m; sights: optical telescopic; crew: one commander (also gunner) plus one helicopter pilot.

The PAH-1 Weapons System

After this start and on the basis of the lessons learned in cooperation with the American Hueycobra AH-1, the combat forces came up with high expectations for the PAH-1 weapons system. If we keep in mind that the BO-105P PAH-1 was considered an emergency solution, then its achievements are astonishingly good. To be sure, it lost much of the acrobatic flexibility which the BO-105C basic model had ahead of all other designs and which therefore again and again

became the helicopter world champion; but it was nevertheless still so small and so "handy" that it was able easily to find cover in the terrain and that it was able to maneuver safely between obstacles. This was its greatest advantage thanks to the jointless rotor system and the high-positioned tail rotor. The armament, including six guided HOT rockets, was feasible only at the expense of restricted flying time. On hot days, in action areas on higher elevations, the PAH used up its entire performance reserve to hover in position. Its maneuverability at full load was clearly restricted in such locations. It was necessary to regain it by reducing the payload. This is a basic disadvantage. Demanding growth toward a night-time action capability under these circumstances means running into very limited practical implementation opportunities. Another, tactically grave disadvantage grew from the cockpit enclosure which would shine in almost any light and which greatly contributed to optical detection. The side-by-side crew seating arrangement is still a trouble spot for many tandem seating advocates in many theoretical discussions. The PAH-1 crews swear by it because cooperation and rapid communication in the cockpit is considerably easier this way. The helicopter's greater width does not mean anything in terms of its being discovered at a combat range of 3,000-4,000 m. On the other hand, the advantages of a technically expensive tandem seating arrangement and the greater overall length of the fuselage, together with the connected aspect of clumsiness during hovering within the range of obstacles can be avoided.

The great hit accuracy of the HOT was achieved last but not least by the transmission of the control impulses by wire. This of course also entails considerable disadvantages both during the firing process and thereafter when the helicopter, continuing to fight in the same terrain, is in danger of getting caught in its own guide wire. Wire is the main obstacle for low-flying helicopters in the Central European environment to begin with. Detectors, which allow reliable early warning also against thin cables not conducting any current, are not in the offing. It is therefore all the more difficult to understand that it should take so long to attach mechanically simple cable hood devices on helicopters. It is not the centimeter-thick high-voltage power lines, which one can easily see that should be the guide for the cutting performance but rather the many thin wires from telephone to high-intensity current cables, from the kite line to the HOT guide wire, of which the terrain is full, even in less populated areas.

Stronger gears, a stiffer airframe structure, yaw regulators and the weapons system distinguish the PAH-1 from the VBH on most points. The additional weight reduces its maneuverability and performance reserves and shortens the total flying time. These restrictions had to be eliminated by adapting the command and operational principles for the PAH-1.

PAH Crew Missions

Commander:

Responsible for helicopter pilot within the meaning of Air Traffic Law;

Plans and orders the tactical employment of his weapons system in the context of the mission;

Helps navigate (support function)--conducts radio communications with half-squadron and possibly with combat units;

Maintains the situation map (1:50,000);

Observes the battlefield and supplements air space observations;

Issues orders as to position and position change;

Leads the firefight;

Initiates and supervises logistic measures;

If necessary, flies the helicopter.

Helicopter pilot:

Prepares helicopter for action;

Maintains his own situation map (1:250,000);

Makes flight preparations;

Flies helicopter according to commander's instructions;

Watches out for obstacles and enemy;

Moves the helicopter into a covered position so long as the commanders has dismounted to get orders;

On command, assumes some of the functions of the commander;

Observes the air space.

PAH-1 in Action

To make sure that AT helicopters will not fly away from their command resources, it is necessary to lead from a "forward" position. Fast response speeds can be attained only through constant communication between the AT helicopter commanders and the major formation to be supported. Besides, the short flight duration of the PAH-1 leads to an advanced supply base which must be kept as close up front as possible and which should cover as much area as possible. Supply platoons must operate secondary supply points for aviation POL and HOT guided rockets in advanced standby areas, in the sector of the divisions, in order to increase the hover time in contact with the enemy. As a rule, these areas are so selected that one AT helicopter squadron will find room in them in a spread-out pattern, so that it can be supplied in less than 15 minutes and so that it can again be engaging the enemy within another 10-15

minutes. Under these conditions, the PAH-1 on the average can fight for one hour. More would be desirable especially since every new approach signifies an additional risk to the crew. The crew always welcomes the prospect of a short break in the advanced standby area because human engineering was neglected also in the PAH-1, as in so many other weapons systems. The seat is too narrow and is anatomically impossible; it causes trouble even after a short flying time. This is another reason for the heavy physical stress on the crew and the resultant limitation on the daily sorties to just three to five (there are hardly any relief crews).

The CP in the advanced standby area generally is manned by the squadron CO of a flying squadron or his substitute. In special situations, the CO of the airborne detachment and sometimes even the regimental CO can command from there. This CP is the link between brigade, division, and regiment. The discussion of operations plans prior to the first AT helicopter mission at brigade proved to be a good idea. Measures to coordinate with air units and army AA defense units are taken at division. There, an AT helicopter liaison team ensures constant information exchange and conferences concerning operational questions. Brigade is concerned with the overall concept of operations command which the AT helicopter is supposed to supplement without hindering or endangering other weapons systems. A knowledge of the barrier and fire plan is just as important here as the situation, the mission, and the intentions of the combat unit. The AT helicopter leader—normally the squadron CO—gets an action demand in terms of time and space from the field unit leader and commits his component units accordingly. The half-squadron (seven PAH-1 helicopters) is the tactical unit. The half-squadron leaders themselves are responsible for combat reconnaissance, current situation information, and exploration of suitable positions. A reconnaissance helicopter, more resistant to fire from light arms, carrying armament against enemy helicopters and infantry targets of opportunity, as well as efficient optronics would be a helpful supplement to the half-squadron but is not available.

Contact with combat units engaging the enemy in general is established via radio during the approach flight. Brigade's voice communications documents must be handed out during the situation conference and that is an essential requirement for this purpose. Each AT helicopter needs one copy so that not only the half-squadron leader can talk to the battalion CO's but so that all crew members can listen in on the battalion and brigade command circuits and the division all around communications service. This also saves time during operations and increases the safety aspect; it does however constitute an additional burden on the crew; voice code instruments would be a definite improvement.

Each crew conducts the firefight on its own. It is also responsible for the selection and occupation of switch positions. This presupposes a certain freedom of movement. This is why a half-squadron will fight in terrain with average coverage covering a width of about 10 km. During concealed approach, the AT helicopter, so to speak, looks for a field of fire and for cover between the obstacles. It is not a good idea to tie the helicopter to certain boundary lines and combat sectors; this is not necessary and even causes trouble. Here we come to one big difference in the operational principles of

American combat helicopters which are tied to the combat units on the company and often the platoon echelons and thus extensively must give up their mobility so that they have to fight from rigidly determined positions. According to the German view, this kind of tie reduces the effectiveness of the PAH-1, it definitely increases the threat to it, and it burdens the platoon leader or company CO with tasks involving target allocation and fire control which they can perform from the ground only in a very imperfect manner.

One thing that is very essential for AT helicopter employment is the realization that it is an unarmored and technically unprotected weapons system whose strength is immediately given away when it gets within range of directly aimed guns weapons. No helicopter can last through a duel with tanks. Therefore the helicopter, as weapons platform, is and remains a standoff system which must seek surprise from covered lurk positions, must, after the sudden fire strike, change position over a large area and in very low-level flight, and attempt a new approach from covered positions again outside the range of enemy weapons. The army is still having trouble understanding this. Terrain with action effect ranges of 3,000-6,000 m and visual observation distances of 500-600 m are rare. The anticipated large number of armored enemy targets and the small number of our own units would persuade us to use AT helicopters also at medium or even short combat ranges where they either get into the action radius of enemy AA defenses or are fired upon by motorized riflemen and small arms. This kind of short-hop sortie mostly leads to the scattering of our resources and is just wrong as holding the AT helicopters back as the corps' last resort.

AT helicopters achieve their best effect in conjunction with the fire of the combat units and the artillery. In this way they also have the most protection.

An essential criterion for the meaningful use of AT helicopters against armored enemy units is the terrain. If the Command Academy of the West German Armed Forces and the 2nd Combat Unit School in Munster had suitable specialized army aviation instructors, then the army's understanding of the special aspects of AT helicopter combat operations would be just as natural in terms of command knowledge as the knowledge relating to the use of artillery or Engineers. Much remains to be made up here in spite of the open-minded approach of army officers regarding the AT helicopter.

Organization

From the operational principles we must derive the obvious conclusion that AT helicopters should be assigned to the brigades but at least to the division. The advantages are quite obvious. The fact that this was not done in the course of Army Organization 4 probably is due primarily to economic reasons. First of all, not every divisional combat sector is good for AT helicopters. The weather in the left half of a corps sector might permit AT helicopter flight and combat operations but not on the right. One division might find itself facing a massed armored enemy while the other one might be facing mostly infantry. These examples alone show that AT helicopters cannot

always be used in a division. Conversely, a hard-pressed major unit will be tempted to use all of its resources, including its AT helicopters, even if the existentially necessary "standoff requirement" cannot be met. In this way AT helicopters are in danger of being lost without any need.

When placed under corps, these dangers can be extensively eliminated and it is possible to provide for economical employment and optimum utilization. With 56 PAH-1 helicopters for each corps, the idea of economizing on resources is an essential requirement, especially when the supply of guided HOT rockets is not unlimited.

Next we have logistic viewpoints. A comparatively complicated weapons system, such as the PAH-1, requires a number of specialists with lengthy training (there are more than 40 different series of training courses in the formation). Their number and utilization must remain within a meaningful ratio to the number of helicopters. The same applies to expensive special equipment. Finally, the infrastructure for peacetime operation also necessitates centralization. These were the essential reasons for concentrating the PAH-1 helicopters on the corps echelon in the proven regimental pattern.

Since the introduction of so-called "rationalized and centralized technical operations command" in the aircraft equipment inventory of the Federal Armed Forces, the air accident rate has dropped significantly. Today, Army Aviation is definitely below the Armed Forces average with about 0.2 air accidents per 10,000 flying hours and it is one of the safest "flying outfits" also on an international comparison. This is the way things must remain in spite of AT helicopter flight operations with the particularly high risks involved. The prerequisites for this include thorough, standardized training, high-quality and effective command, and conscientious logistic support. In meeting such requirements, the regimental organization in the past proved itself to be quite efficient. This is why it was selected for inclusion of the PAH-1 as the optimum organizational form. The bases selected were Celle for the 16th Army Aviation Regiment; Fritzlar for the 36th Army Aviation Regiment; and Roth for the 26th Army Aviation Regiment. The 6th Army Aviation Regiment remained at the old base of the former battalion in Itzehoe.

In addition to the mentioned advantages of specialization, the regimental organizational setup also has some clear disadvantages. The most obvious one is its size and complexity. Even more essential is the discrepancy between the peacetime organization based on STAN (T/O&E) and combat organization, such as it was outlined already in conjunction with the command principles. The creativity of the organizers obviously was not enough to adapt awkward building blocks--which had been given in technical STAN terms--to the operational requirements. In practice it is therefore often necessary to improvise. Likewise, it was impossible to coordinate unit personnel subordination relationships with the management systems belonging within centralized technical operations command. But here again many years of experience resulted in practicable functional methods. Finally, the so-called augmentation position of the half-regiment makes peacetime work difficult, in other words, about 800 men must be recalled through mobilization. This applies primarily to the supply platoons in the Army Aviation supply squadrons which, in the corps sector, are distributed over all three regiments and which are available neither in peacetime nor

during the early phase of a national emergency. As we said initially, they however constitute one requirement for the employment of the PAH-1 which we cannot do without and they are needed also in peacetime for training and exercises. Here it is necessary to improvise under considerable difficulties until such time as a meaningful solution can be found. This turns out to be so difficult only because personnel reserves are not available. Army Aviation in Army Structure 4 had to build up, in addition, three AT helicopter regiments plus the mixed regiment for the 6th Armored Infantry Division in Schleswig-Holstein, without being allowed to exceed its personnel strength of about 10,000 men. This means that our personnel are spread too thin and when it comes to cadre manning, this also necessitates the introduction of those duty positions which would really be indispensable in peacetime likewise. In longer-range terms, it will be inevitable to put up smaller organizational units than the regiments without having to lose any efficiency. If the regiment has a total of 25 military personnel for each helicopter, then this is a ratio which is still too unfavorable. Streamlining our training by removing maximum requirements, abandoning utilization series which are alien to the basic function and which are based on the preservation of the existing inventory will be just as urgent as the radical disconnection of ineffective support services, such as certain sectors in the flight control field and in geophysics. But Army Aviation cannot do that by itself; the policymakers must clear the way here.

Training and Operations

Our 3 years of experience with the PAH-1 showed us that--in spite of so-called successive supply readiness--we were able to attain a high technical level and safer flight operations; this last but not least is evidence of the quality of technical and flight training. Following advanced training for PAH-1, plus tactical and basic firing training at the Army Aviation Weapons School, the formation as such must see to it that helicopter pilots are familiarized with their tasks in the half-squadron [helo section]. They must be familiar with their operational areas during all kinds of weather, they must utilize the protection offered and they must avoid their dangers. This training is given in low-flying exercise areas which extensively overlap with the operational areas. In tactical exercise situations, the helo section flies about 100 ft above ground level and at a speed of 200 km/hr, in ground-hugging flight, from the regimental standby area to the forward standby area, it is refuelled and continues to fly on to a meeting point with the helo section leader or squadron CO. There the commanders get their action orders while the helicopter pilots stand ready for call in an assembly area with the AT helicopters spread out. After taking off again, the helicopters fly a covered approach between the trees and the high-voltage power lines, heading to the front. During observation stops, the crews look for the enemy from covered positions, obtain situation information from the combat units on the ground, and finally, sneaking up on the enemy, they seek the best position for the firefight. This procedure requires an accurate knowledge of the terrain and the obstacles, that is to say, it means repeated practice sessions in the same area. The annoyance of the population and the animal world seems bearable because there are hardly any complaints. Compared to the number of helicopters, the exercise area of course is very big so that the overflight or fly-past frequency in one particular place is small. Sound propagation is

limited and of short duration in low-level flight. Besides, the BO-105P is a comparatively low-noise helicopter. Particular emphasis is placed on cooperation with the combat units on the ground. Participation in planning and terrain conferences provides basic knowledge on the mission and on the planned operations of the major unit. Brigade and battalion exercises provide training in practical cooperation.

The AT helicopter mission of course can be tested under realistic conditions only in the course of large-scale maneuvers. But the opportunity for that is rare. Differentiation between friend and foe proves to be a problem. Technical aids, such as NIS-BIFF (NATO-Identification System for Battlefield Identification Friend-Foe) are indispensable at combat engagement ranges of 4,000 m.

The optical telescopic sight cannot offer sufficiently reliable identification when the atmosphere is clouded if, by way of guidance, we agree that the identification range is half the meteorological visibility. Procedural regulations from the obsolete Air Traffic Law and its followup decrees are also rather laborious for low-level flight by AT helicopters in its potential operations areas. The low-level flight regulations, requirements for field landings, ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) flight approach methods along the borders with the GDR and Czechoslovakia would urgently have to be adapted in order to restore legal safety in flight operations which is something we must absolutely have.

Air traffic control and the weather service are likewise far below the requirements of helicopter flying in general and AT helicopter operations in particular. Our most experienced crews, who are well coordinated, so far have assured accident-free flight operations in the major units. It is necessary to create clear command principles and coordinated methods to make sure that this will continue to be so in the future.

Outlook

During the determination of the series readiness of the PAH-1, it was already agreed that additional budget funds should if possible not be used for detailed improvements but should rather be used for the PAH-2. For example, we are going to have to continue to live with the many minor and major inadequacies of the PAH-1. We will have to come to terms with a situation where the refueling nozzle has to be threaded through the struts of the rocket launch ramp if one does not have any hose extension, that the cockpit light will burn during night-time flying only if the engine happens to be running, that the landing searchlight has more of a blinding effect than a visibility-creating effect, or that the periscope in the summer is smeared with flies because, instead of being protected in the direction of flight, it is retained in position toward the tail end. We yearn for the simple mechanical regulation of the heating system instead of the expensive regulator system which hits you with occasional blasts of hot air and sometimes cold air but which rarely gives you the right dose. The countless, finger-nail-slitting little levers, the little switches, and the little screws will have to be operated while wearing gloves and you will also have to learn to stow your maps which are

almost 1 m square, your steel helmet, your sleeping bag, your NBC protective clothing, your weapon, and your emergency rations in such a manner that it will not hit you in the back of the neck while flying but will nevertheless be within reach--in other words, man was not figured to be a part of that system, or so it seems.

It would of course be very annoying if similar basic shortcomings were to be encountered in the PAH-2.

To avoid that, the PAH-2 would have to be a weapons system:

With compact structural dimensions;

With an adequate performance reserve and with engines which--separated from each other in terms of space--will respond so fast that, if one turbine should fail, you can still keep the helicopter hovering.

A future PAH must:

Have wire-free rocket control and that does not have to be "fire-and-forget,"

Have an efficient sight with FIFF and

Be so provided with instruments that the pilot, when flying within range of obstacles, will have essential characteristic data within his field of vision,

While the vision must be good and must if possible be all-around and

The optronic signature must be low.

The extent to which IR and radar signatures must be attenuated, how resistant the air frame must be to fire and breakage, whether the flying time should be 2 hours or 3 hours--these are things which one could discuss just like the question as to what night-flying or foul-weather capabilities mean, whether de-icing systems justify the added weight with all of its disadvantages, and where technical effort stops. One should exercise self-control here in the light of past practical experience. There is reason to doubt that the effort--such as it is being made in the United States with the Hughes AH-64A attack helicopter--is really necessary. The army certainly is going to face the task of beating off attacks by enemy pursuit helicopters. Helicopters are presumably more suited for this than other weapons. AT helicopters will also have to defend themselves against that enemy. It may also be necessary to beat off enemy infantry when the AT helicopter during combat reconnaissance or airborne operations are forced to land. We ought to be able at least to neutralize the enemy by means of secondary armament so that we can then disengage.

While the particular task in each case is:

Wipe out tanks,

Engage helicopters,

Neutralize infantry targets of opportunity,

The important thing is to confine the future weapons carriers to a particular role and to keep it complex and small. This way they will have a real chance to accomplish their mission; by the way, they will be so simple that the operations and maintenance effort will permit the procurement and operation of a suitable number of systems. If necessary, a basic model could be used as weapons carrier for several types of missions. The important thing is to explore and find the lower limit of that which is tactically necessary and technically feasible and quickly to work out a solution, even if it is the second-best solution. On that foundation, every plus in terms of quantity is more important than a plus in terms of quality. The army regulations entitled "Truppenfuehrung" [Unit Command] of the Reichswehr [German Armed Forces between the World Wars] contains the following passage: Only that which is simple is successful in war. But recognizing that which is simple is usually difficult.

Today, Army Aviation is 25 years old and we certainly wish for it that it would recognize that which is simple and that it can make it available to the army at the right time.

5058

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ALBION PLATEAU MISSILES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACE ENEMY CRUISE MISSILES

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French May 82 pp 31-45

[Article by Dominique David and Guy-Philippe Halleman: "Cruise Missiles and French Defense"]

[Text] The long debate on ratification of SALT II, on the future of certain strategic nuclear systems of the medium-size powers, and NATO's decision of December 1979 have occasioned various reviews of the problems posed by the cruise missiles.

Dominique David, a researcher in the Strategic Research and Studies Group (GRES), and Guy-Philippe Halleman, a journalist, express here their opinion on the interest of the system within a specifically French framework.

As a gadget from the creators of military fashions, or as a new weapon that revolutionizes the tactical and strategic capacities of the defense structures, the cruise missile has for some years been at the heart of the debates on the future of the nuclear arsenals.

In France, this weapon has barely entered into the realm of public debate. However, the French nuclear forces, like the others, are doubly concerned by the evolution of this technology: by the use that allies or adversaries or others could make of it, which automatically has an effect on our capacities or vulnerabilities, and by the place that it may eventually have in the modernization of our "strategic" components or of our tactical forces.

On the 1990 horizon, where will the cruise-missile fleets of the principal nuclear nations be?

In the East, the big naval units have been equipped since the middle of the 1960's with missiles functioning on a logic comparable to that of the cruise missiles. However, they seem to make use of conventional technologies, to which the systems used for the Exocet or the Harpoon are related. These Soviet systems are distinctly inferior, in terms of range and precision, to their most recent American counterparts. It is probable, though, that in the face of the American developments, the Soviet Union, in accordance with an armament tradition that insists on the virtues of "technological parity," will design its own version of the American systems.

In 1975, the "Yearbook" of the SIPRI [expansion unknown] listed the "Western" countries that could make use of the new technology: the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India, Sweden, the FRG, Italy, Israel, in addition to the United States. Seven years later, only the United States seems to be still in the running.

The United Kingdom is not envisioning the deployment of such systems. But several years later, such deployment was seriously studied within the framework of replacement of the present Polaris nuclear force. As the moment of choice approached, though, the cruise-missile hypothesis disappeared from the scene, leaving only the ballistic-modernization options.

The United States, for its part, is presently building nuclear-warhead cruise missiles that can be launched from bombers, ships, submarines, and even (for NATO) from launchers on land. The American Air Force is testing an airplane-launched missile (ALCM: Air-Launched Cruise Missile), and the Navy, a sea-launched system (SLCM: Sea-Launched Cruise Missile), the Tomahawk. The latest figures therefore show several thousand cruise missiles to be assigned to the elements of the American strategic "triad." However, a number of tactical cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warhead are also planned.

The Adversary's Deployment

Thus, cruise missiles are not a weapon of a radically new type. NATO, for example, has had in its arsenals since the 1950's weapons that function on the same principles. But the technical developments of the last decade have helped place the debate in new terms: miniaturization of the charges, growing strike precision, spectacular increase in range, diversification of the launchers, supposed decrease in costs, etc.

If we restrict ourselves to the French debate, we therefore cannot avoid raising it in terms of the potentials of the other nuclear powers. Does the fact that potential adversaries or present allies have cruise missiles cast doubt on our nuclear-deterrence capacity or strengthen it?

To declare today that the French nuclear-deterrence force is credible--as is disputed by few analysts, no matter what consequences they may draw from this fact--amounts to declaring that this credibility is relatively independent of the level of the adversary's nuclear armaments.

Relatively: because this relationship would again become significant in two cases--and for the time being, two cases only. First of all, if the enemy had the capacity to destroy all of our land-based systems (silos, air bases, etc), without damage to the civilian population, it could dangle in front of us the fallacious choice between limited destruction like this and a decision on our part to go all the way to apocalypse. Secondly, if the enemy had the capacity for a total preemptive strike, against our land-based and submarine forces, he would then disarm us at a blow.

With this summary stated, which is the essence of the French deterrence, the question therefore becomes: would the cruise missiles held, or eventually held, by the adversary justify his formulation of one of these two hypotheses?

It seems that the answer is indeed no. While cruise missiles are not the instrument for a submarine war, neither are they the means for a "surgical" land war. Neither the precision nor the miniaturization of the present or foreseeable charges makes it possible to envision the hypothesis of a land-disarmament strike without too much "collateral damage." At this level, deployment of enemy cruise missiles therefore would not change the terms of the current debate on the credibility of the French force--just as it would not, for that matter, be upset either by the modernization of the ballistic systems, for example, including the SS-20's.

The question of defense against the adversary's cruise missiles is therefore not different from the question posed in the case of use of ballistic systems against us. Neither does deployment of such vectors imply--or contraindicate--that we should plan for the installation of interception systems which, in order to be effective, would have to be very extensive, and therefore subtract heavily from the other budget categories of our security posture.

At present, none of our potential adversaries has a fleet of long-range--that is, strategic--cruise missiles that could threaten us. But if such a fleet were to exist tomorrow, it would threaten us, of course, but without affecting the essential credibility of our deterrence.

Allied Deployment

The allied deployments can also have some influence on our defense "posture." Essentially, first of all, there is the fact that the United States is providing itself with cruise missiles, which justifies our raising the question in France. As regards the materiel developed in the United States, it can be imagined that some technological transfers may occur, especially for the guidance equipment. Furthermore, in the present state of affairs, it is the existence of American satellites that would make it possible for this materiel to function, Europe being totally lacking in it.

A power that has considerable aerial or ballistic means of interception available--as is the case with the two superpowers--the cruise missile can be stopped with relative ease. A 1980 report by the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies, of London) spoke of a 60-percent stopping possibility (in-flight interception plus destruction on arrival). An attack would therefore have to be massive, so that the "surviving" missiles would have sufficient destructive power in themselves.

The Soviet defense system--since that is what we are talking about--appears, from all indications, to be "aimed" toward an American attack. Therefore it is highly doubtful that, unless it reoriented the whole of its forces around this type of vector, a power such as France would have by itself the power to "saturate" the Soviet formations, so as to make sure that the few significant missiles "get through." The fact that cruise missiles can be used only en masse in order to be strategically effective largely disqualifies the hypothesis of solitary use.

Of course, a combination with the allied military systems could then be found. An addition of specifically American cruise missiles to the cruise missiles of

the Alliance, and to the cruise missiles of the medium-size nuclear powers, could, operationally speaking, be significant. But on this hypothesis, one may not lose sight of the fact that an "adjustment" of defense doctrine would prove necessary. At the time of the British debate of 1979-1980, the fact was sometimes brought out clearly that to deploy cruise missiles without totally restructuring the strategic force around their imperatives would amount to assigning to the country a sort of limited tactical role within the Alliance's strategy.

Finally, the setting-up of a credible cruise-missile system--credible as regards the number of vectors and as regards precision on target--almost inevitably supposes collaboration among Western allies, and especially among Europeans. In effect, only large-scale assembly-line production would permit quantitative saturation--or aid to saturation--of the enemy defense systems and make it possible to keep costs within reasonable limits by comparison with the ballistic systems of equivalent strategic effect. On the other hand, only the launching and maintenance of specifically European satellites would make possible the acquisition of data necessary for determination of the missiles' trajectories.

Now it is improbably--and especially within the current and the foreseeable short-term economic situation--that a medium-size nuclear power could provide itself with all of these means all by itself. The alternatives are either to hook directly on to the American wagon, or that of NATO--but what would the supercilious French independence of decision then become?--or collaboration among Europeans, which would pose a great many political, economic, or quite simply legal problems: would the FRG--the most "interesting" power for financial collaboration--be able to participate, even indirectly, in the deployment of nuclear armaments, in a program resulting in the military use of observation satellites?

French Missiles and Global Strategic Relationships

One therefore sees, as these remarks develop, that the question of cruise missiles, for a power of the size of France, cannot be treated without reference to the external dependencies and interdependencies. But in parallel, this question, of course, depends on a more specifically national treatment concerning the inherent utility of such systems for the overall French defense formation.

In concrete terms of precision, range, speed, the cruise missile is not of any greater interest than highly developed conventional ballistic systems. Its interest lies in two elements above all: its production cost and its flexibility as regards the forms of its carriers.

In the middle of the 1960's, France and the United Kingdom based themselves on these two elements in reflecting on an eventual deployment of these systems. At the end of the decade, though, there was a return to the ballistic approach, the "positive" factors having gradually been reversed: the satellites acquiring the data needed for guidance, the necessity of mass production in order to have a barrage defense and of building both numerous and invulnerable launching platforms--all these being elements that relativize the cost advantage.

The cost argument was of prime importance, though, especially for France. Let us recall that from 1977 to 1981, the French nuclear force consumed from 16 to 19 percent of the defense-budget total, while for the United Kingdom it was less than 2 percent of the same budget, by virtue of the preferential agreements made with the United States. If the technological breakthrough of the new cruise missiles had made it possible, for a distinctly lower cost, to maintain or strengthen the deterrent power of a medium-size power possessing nuclear weaponry, the matter would have been of the first importance. The atom would then have had an equalizing power not only in strategic terms but also in financial terms.

Thus General Mery stressed, in 1977, the coming importance, for France, of the cruise-missiles/observation-satellites pairing. A year later, the president of the republic again spoke positively of this hypothesis. It should be noted that this prospect of enhancing French nuclear prestige was not, at the time, accompanied by any adjustment of doctrine. It may be asked, though, whether multiplication of the vectors entails or not, ipso facto, a certain shift toward an antiassets strategy, or at least one of "limitation of damage"--a strategy of management of the nuclear "excess."

In the French debate, as it has developed in recent years, the rationality of a deployment of cruise missiles has been viewed as a rationality of reinforcement, not of substitution. Its logic therefore can be evaluated only in relation to the upgrading achieved within the present doctrinal framework--amended, perhaps, but fundamentally unchanged.

This doctrinal framework is confronted not only with the obsolescence inherent in the French systems but also, and especially, with the evolution, quantitative and qualitative, of the "balance" of world forces. Three principal lines of movement can be imagined for this balance: multiplication of ICBM's as a result of the winding-down, the practical stoppage of the SALT process; a more permissive reshaping of the SALT I treaty of 1972 to achieve limitation of the antiballistic-missile systems; and development of "intermediate" or wider-theater weaponry (consider the modernization of the Soviet or American IRBM's [Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles], for example). These alternatives will be the consequence of the probable upsetting of the global strategic relationship to the advantage of the American forces, as a result of the deployments, to start in the middle of the 1980's, of the materiel being prepared in the United States.

All this naturally poses--apart from the problem, considered above, of the adversary's aggression systems--the question of maintenance of the effectiveness of the French strategic forces once they are launched, and therefore the possible contribution that cruise missiles could make to them.

The present strategic landscape hardly seems to make it necessary to adopt a system that would be redundant in relation to the current ballistic capacities. One can always ponder the possibility of a complementary penetration capacity, the synergic value of a strategic strike based on multiple-penetration systems; but the present ballistic missiles guarantee the permanence of a counterstrike threat, a permanence that cannot be jeopardized in the absence of any precise

threat against their penetration capacity. Furthermore, the coexistence of two types of strategic vectors would pose some tricky operational problems, including that of coordination of strikes, if it were decided to stay with the same type of targets: optimal allocation of the vectors can become difficult, if one wants to avoid overprogramming certain targets.

On the other hand, the current challenge to the 1972 treaty limiting the defensive systems could enhance the advantage of a multiple-penetration capacity. The British and French missiles' "free ride" to the enemy would essentially be called into question. But in this hypothesis, would cruise missiles constitute the necessary parry?

Once again, these missiles would have to get through defenses made to stop the advance of their American counterparts. Therefore, even in this hypothesis, there is a quantitative threshold below which the accumulation of nuclear systems does not "produce" any additional security for France. But we do not set this threshold ourselves. And it is not even set in a systems of references, in a strategic logic, that are comparable to ours.

Of course, a cruise missile can explode its nuclear charge at any point of the enemy territory it is flying over, if its means of detection advise it of a threat that could cause its destruction. But such voluntary premature explosion would not necessarily fall within the framework of programmed anticities reprisal.

However, certain American simulations indicate that a relatively small number of cruise missiles can saturate local defenses. Certain objectives, strategic but limited, could therefore justify salvos of this amplitude. The tactical problem would then consist in ensuring rapid concentration of missiles on a given point: a reevaluation of the classic breakthrough maneuver, obviously depending on the type of defenses deployed by the Soviets. But some of the few studies published suggest that it would be possible to neutralize certain defenses, notably by the establishment of electromagnetic "channels" running through the enemy formation.

A French cruise missile deployed toward the end of this century could have characteristics superior to those of the current American generations. It can be imagined that it would have a certain capacity to modify its trajectory in function of the electromagnetic threats detected; in other terms, a strongly defended objective could be bypassed on the spot in favor of a secondary target, after an evaluation made by the on-board means of detection. In effect, for reasons both technical and financial, a system of total defensive coverage belongs to the realm of the imaginary. But this overall picture reaffirms the definition of this cruise missile as a complementary weapon: for does one base a strategy of massive reprisals on a targeting of secondary targets?

Furthermore, development of effective ABM systems would ineluctably be accompanied by deployments of specifically anti-cruise-missile weapons. It is therefore chancy, to say the least, to conclude that a jeopardizing of the ballistic systems by the deployment of ABM's would immediately be parried by development of a fleet of cruise missiles.

The Future of the Land-Based Component

In the perspective of the maintenance of the national deterrence capacity, we have chosen to pay special attention to one particular problem here: that of the vulnerability of the ground-to-ground cruise missiles stored on the Albion Plateau.

Continuance of the airborne component should be ensured, at least in part, by deployment of Mirage 2000's equipped with medium-range air-to-ground missiles. Could development of cruise missiles constitute an element of response to the problem posed by the survival of the land-based component of our strategic triad?

Such could be the case only if, within the framework of an unchanged rationale requiring the maintenance of land-based missiles, it were demonstrated that the cruise missiles would be less vulnerable than the present silos. The land-based cruise missile would be invulnerable on condition that it is entirely mobile. Furthermore, such mobility would correspond to one of the principal characteristics of this weapon: its light weight. Weighing scarcely more than a ton, it is perfectly adaptable to a truck that could move about almost unlimitedly--which, so far as is known, is not the case, for example, with the launching platforms of the Soviet SS-20's.

In a country such as France, though, the only type of mobility envisioned would consist in placing cruise missiles on trucks that move about within a limited perimeter--on military terrain. Such movement is scarcely imaginable in "open" terrain: who would be prepared to have /charged/ nuclear missiles circulate on the roads of France and Navarre? On military terrain, which is necessarily limited, such movement could quite easily be subjected to adversary countermeasures. Furthermore, the alternative solution consisting in moving missiles, of whatever type, between fixed launching pads is not relevant either: in view of the limited character of the forces fielded by France, all of such launch pads would be programmed by the adversary.

On the hypothesis of a land-based version, it does not seem that cruise missiles should offer invulnerability radically different from that of conventional ballistic missiles. The fact remains that it may be necessary in future to maintain this "land-based" strategic component.

Within the current nuclear framework, land-based missiles offer a double advantage: the time needed for activating them is relatively short; and communications between command post and launching post are also faster and more reliable than in the case of the other two components. This double characteristic could theoretically authorize either a preventive strike--one that initiates the conflict, not reprisals--which cruise missiles, because of their low speed, could not bring off, or a strike aimed at escaping the enemy's missiles. The first type of strike is ruled out by the French doctrine. The second type supposes that France is equipped with sufficient, and especially advanced, detection systems.

There remains entailment capacity: destruction of the Albion missiles would entail counterstrike by the remaining systems. But this capacity clearly de-

depends, for its part, on the quantity of destruction inflictible by the submarines present in their firing ranges at any moment. If the Albion Plateau were destroyed, all the systems based on land (airborne and on the ground) could be also, and doubtlessly would be. Their destruction would entail a French reprisal strike only to the extent that that strike would be sufficiently destructive, and destructive by itself.

The paradox of the argument based on the entailment role of the land-based force is therefore that this force depends largely on the credibility of another component. In other words--and succinctly--the maintenance of a vulnerable land-based force (even if formed of cruise missiles) is defensible only by an increase in the number of submarine systems. The consequence is obvious: the financial emphasis may not be placed on the land-based systems. But as is known, cruise missiles, because of their technical-environment requirements, have proved to be less of a bargain than was initially believed.

To be sure, deployment of numerous and mobile cruise missiles would perhaps make it possible to manipulate one of the contradictions inherent in the land-based strategic forces. The relatively long distance between deployment sites and urban centers presents the possibility, for the enemy, of limiting the collateral damage resulting from a selective attack. However, the missiles are installed in hardened silos, which would have to be attacked by high megatonnage which itself increases the magnitude of the collateral damage.

A quantitatively sufficient deployment of cruise missiles could enable the political powers to manipulate this paradox by exploiting the mobility of the missiles. "Strategic risk management" would then be aimed at modulating the ratio of land-based nuclear capacity to collateral damage, by minimizing one or the other of the terms of the alternative: possibility of collective destruction of the isolated silos, or destruction entailing a social risk of great importance. This "good usage" of cruise missiles (deployment of missiles far from one another, scattered and not programmable by the adversary) would perhaps be able to avoid the "notification" attack that the Albion Plateau is presently subject to.

However, such a perspective is rather heretical in relation to the present French nuclear posture, and in particular, it may be asked whether the enhanced capacity to come in future would justify the whole of the financial effort demanded. Another heresy--that of the shift from an anticities strategy to an antiassets strategy (economic assets especially)--could also justify a fleet of cruise missiles. But that heresy is fundamental, and would its deterrent effect truly be optimized? The more so as the flexibility and precision of cruise missiles make them specifically antiforce weapons, with a great deal of excess capacity in antiurban or antieconomic terms.

Tactical Perspectives

For all of these reasons, the deployment of cruise missiles seems scarcely significant, in the present state of French doctrine. But strategic use, of course, is not the only kind that can be imagined.

The cruise missile--difficult to intercept totally if a large number of them are in motion, and capable of 100-percent destruction of its target--is not an instrument for demonstration but a mode of destruction. In medium range, it could be an antiassets instrument (military assets in the rear, supply centers, etc); in short range, it would necessarily be one of the elements of forward battle.

Of course, the battle/nonbattle debate is presently theological in part. A battle, or rather an armed confrontation, in a forward zone--that is, at least at our borders, whichever they might be, and not only to the east--would take place (at least one may hope so) before the intervention of our strategic capacities becomes obvious. Current French thinking does not at all dismiss such a confrontation.

The problem remains--not an academic problem as regards such a confrontation--of knowing what its purpose would be. Either it is made a battle, in the strict sense of the term--that is, an operational whole, relatively isolable on the conceptual and practical levels, with at least a tactical purpose in itself: that is, capable of being /won/; or one tries to make it a limited confrontation, but one that is open for a counterstrike that is not graduated but massive. The distinction between a tactical battlefield weapon and tactical demonstration weapon is therefore largely illusory: who believes he could simply, calmly, make a "sign" when strong armies are at our borders? On the other hand, though, there is indeed a difference in conception as between the idea of a stopping battle and that of a confrontation that could be called a primer or igniter.

Once the impasse on forward armament is dismissed, we must therefore find weaponry that "hurts"--that is, one that clearly registers our will on the adversary; otherwise, we could go ahead with a warning shot in any other place--at sea, for example. But we cannot believe that such weaponry will suffice to halt the adversary, or even disorganize him enough that at Strasbourg he would be forced to turn back home even after having already swept aside the Alliance's conventional defenses in the FRG.

In this perspective, what is a fleet of cruise missiles worth? The Pluton missiles are not just the instrument for a simple "sign"; at least in their range, they have considerable destructive capacity. The Hades will increase this capacity, since this weapon, striking in depth in relation to the presumed line of attack, is considered to be able to destroy at the same time the forward line and the enemy's second echelon of attack. In this picture, the cruise missile could be at least redundant, and at worst, dangerous.

It would be redundant because it would be assigned the same tasks as the present or planned weapons (tactical aviation, for example). It would perhaps be dangerous because of its theoretical precision; it could give the French armed forces the illusion that a stoppage is possible, by the aid of tactical materiel, or battlefield materiel, alone. Now such stoppage is conceivable (which does not mean achievable), but only within the framework of a generalized and coordinated framework in which France would have a very good chance of losing all its ideas of decision-making independence.

One of the current debates on the enhanced-radiation weapon is found again here in relation to the cruise missile. If such weapons were used by France alone, there is a strong chance that they would not do any good, in view of the disparity of the opposing forces. If they are used jointly, France thereby loses the "independent" advantage of choice of its strategy /within/ the crisis or conflict.

This line of questioning can only be intensified if it is recalled that short-range cruise missiles could very well carry conventional charges, and therefore number among the means for a confrontation that would remain conventional, for a long moment, before becoming nuclear.

Here again, the Academy imposes on us the classic debate between lowering and raising of the nuclear threshold: in order for deterrence to be effective, it is /necessary/ to lower (or raise) the threshold of conventional-to-nuclear transition. Normative analysis is not necessary here. But one is obliged to note that at the present moment, no analysis, theoretical or practical, of what could happen in Europe once a conflict were started is capable of distinguishing between the /range/ of the means and the /progressiveness/ of the means. This is to say that to the ongoing growth of the range of means available there automatically corresponds a prospect of progressive use of weapons from what is conceived of as the least dangerous to the most devastating ones. And such progressiveness--one is forced to come back to this point--can only be put into effect collectively.

To put it another way, one may ask whether, at this "tactical" or close-theater level, the cruise missile, in its double version, "conventional" or "nuclear," is the symbolic image of a sort of "French-type graduated response." But the misfortune is not so much that "graduated response" is forbidden by Gallic canon law, or that it is an indecent perversion in itself. No, the misfortune is the real fact that it is impossible to implement in France and by France, even apart from any judgment as to its effectiveness. In effect, it presupposes the availability, at each stage of the confrontation, of materiel sufficient at the same time for blockage and for concatenation, which is manifestly beyond the reach of a medium-size nuclear power, unless it conceives its role within the framework of a general maneuver of a coalition of forces.

The discussion about the tactical cruise missile is therefore a particular form of the general debate on the place of theater weapons in the deterrence strategy of a medium-size nuclear power. It can also be added that deployment of weapons that can be made in two versions will not help in quantitative control of deployments and will therefore, in addition, impede any attempts at "armaments control," so long as such control continues to be based on counting of warheads rather than analysis of missions.

Critical foreigners assert that the native arrogance of the French prevents them from renouncing a type of weapon so long as it is not demonstrated that it is impossible for them to have it.

To prescind from the question of national psychologies, it is entirely natural that those who have responsibility for thinking about the future of the defense

system of a medium-size power have leaned toward a type of weaponry of which it may be thought that, financially and technically, it could change many of the fundamental facts of the problem.

Upon reflection, it modifies them little. It is hard to see what the cruise missile, as a tactical aid, would do today in our defense system, and it is even harder to see how it would combine with the other means--those already in existence or programmed.

At the strategic level, the cruise missile is hardly a response to the foreseeable evolutions of the relationships of forces and of nuclear technologies in the short and medium terms. In the long term, if a few technical breakthroughs were to jeopardize the possibility of ballistic defense (breakthrough in the area of antisubmarine warfare, antisatellite warfare, for example), this jeopardy would be such as to affect profoundly the logic of weak-against-strong deterrence, especially as regards cruise missiles.

Let us keep it in mind that in order for cruise missiles to be effective and significant, they must have a sophisticated technical environment, and are therefore all the more vulnerable in any eventual confrontation; and in this regard, the relative "crudeness" of the present systems may, on the contrary, contribute to their effectiveness.

In the present state of the French logic, one can only conclude that the cruise missile, at any level, is poorly suited to it. This does not at all mean that it has to be ruled out in other lines of reasoning that are based on different premises--for example, those that currently prevail in the United States.

11267

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ENI'S ENERGY REPORT FOR 1970-1980 SUMMARIZED

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 21 May 82 pp 470-473

[Text] During the years of low energy prices, there was a continuous increase in energy intensity understood here as the ratio between energy consumption (to produce goods and services) and units of product (added value resulting from the production of said goods) while from 1973 until today we have had a progressive decline due to various causes, primarily identifiable as structural changes and forms of conservation. For Italy, which heavily depends on almost completely imported crude derivatives, the decline in energy intensity is attributable to the rise in the price of crude, whose development is shown in Table A.

Table A.

		1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
2	Intensità energetica	100	103,5	99,2	98,1	99,3	96,1	95,9	94,7	90,3
3	Prodol. interno lordo (1)	100	112,3	116,9	112,7	119,3	121,6	124,7	130,9	135,2
4	Prezzo del petrolio (1)	100	127,8	358,3	317,3	357,8	348,4	298,9	340,5	494,0

Legend: (1) Constant values, 1970; 2--Energy intensity; 3--Gross domestic product (1); 4--Petroleum price (1). Source: ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] Statistics.

In spite of the fact that energy input was held down during the last decade, the burden of energy imports kept growing which is why the ratio between the energy deficit (balance of energy source imports) and the exports of goods and services rose from 11 percent in 1970 to 27.7 percent 1974 and 29.6 percent in 1980. During the same period of time, there began a process of replacing the petroleum share which dropped from 75 percent in 1973 to 67 percent in 1980, primarily due to the greater consumption of natural gas (from less than 10 percent to 15.5 percent).

Data of this kind are contained in the Energy Report prepared by the ENI of which RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA already summarily indicated some results pertaining to the international market. Concerning the domestic market, energy consumption in user sectors show a variable development caused by various factors. In the industrial sector, the tendency toward the reduction of consumption per unit of product and the substitution of petroleum products with natural

gas grew stronger during the decade of 1970-1980. This is shown in Table B and the gas utilization shares amounting to 16 percent in 1970, 23 percent in 1974 and 30 percent in 1980, as against 70 percent, 63 percent, and 54 percent for the petroleum products during those same years.

Table B. Numerical Indicators (1970 = 100)

		1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
2	V.A. industria (1)	100	112,9	118,2	107,6	118,4	120,0	122,6	129,4	135,7
3	Intensità energetica	100	97,5	96,7	94,6	92,2	89,8	84,7	82,4	77,7
4	Prezzo olio combustib. (1)	100	96,8	169,7	217,3	211,7	237,0	204,4	234,8	315,3

Legend: (1) Constant values, 1970; 2--Industrial added value (1); 3--Energy intensity; 4--Fuel oil price (1). Source: ENI Statistics.

In 1980 in general there was a decrease (down 2 percent) in the consumption of fuels in general, with about an equal increase in the consumption of electric energy (to be considered due to the growing optimization and automation of work cycles). In the sector of civilian uses we must register a partial containment of the lesser consumption of fuels due to the progressive saturation of the potential users and the limited extent of housing activities obtained as a result of growing recourse to electric energy although at lower rates than in the past. As we can see in Table C, electric consumption for civilian uses has been increasing continually, in spite of the widespread use of natural gas and reached a figure of 28 percent, approximately, of the energy used in the production of hot water for hygienic and sanitary purposes.

Table C. Numerical Indicators (1970 = 100)

		1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
3	Consumi delle famiglie (1)	100	112,6	115,5	113,9	117,9	120,7	124,3	130,8	136,6
4	Consumi di combustibili (2)	100	122,2	119,3	122,2	127,9	116,8	128,5	127,2	121,4
5	Prezzo del gasolio (1)	100	98,5	196,6	184,3	205,5	235,5	224,3	257,6	345,9
6	Consumi di energia elettrica	100	129,7	137,7	141,6	150,6	158,2	169,8	180,9	187,7

Legend: (1) Constant value, 1970; (2) Petroleum products, solid fuels, natural gas; 3--Family consumption (1); 4--Fuel consumption (2); 5--Gas-oil price (1); 6--Electric energy consumption. Source: ENI Statistics.

In the transportation sector, finally, we observe dynamics superior to those in the earlier sectors described here, with rather noteworthy rates although less than for the 1970-1973 3-year term, in spite of the increase in the cost of fuels. The decline in average travel distance was offset by the increase in the number of cars which came along with the development of diesel cars. Data for gasoline users are given in Table D. The better development in passenger and goods transportation, partly connected with the absence of more powerful engines and the renewal of the mass transportation system, has led to an ever greater role of energy consumption during the decade (essentially from petroleum) as compared to the total national consumption volume. In the general context indicated and with reference to the decade considered,

Italy's degree of energy dependence on foreign sources kept increasing although to a limited extent. The situation, which constitutes grounds for concern in quantitative terms, has been getting worse constantly in economic-financial terms likewise; here it suffices to recall that the average CIF imported crude price went up from about 10,000 lire/t in 1970 to 16,000 in 1973, 19,500 in 1980, and 318,000 in the middle of 1981.

Table D. Numerical Indicators (1970 = 100)

		1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
2	Parco auto a benzina	100	130,8	139,0	144,2	154,0	158,5	162,9	170,8	175,5
	Prezzo della									
3	benzina super (1)	100	97,0	125,3	119,1	137,1	143,3	127,4	118,0	129,8
4	Consumi di benzina	100	121,2	111,6	119,6	115,8	112,9	120,5	130,0	131,5

Legend: (1) Constant value, 1970; 2—Gasoline-operated car inventory; 3—Super gasoline price (1); 4—Gasoline consumption. Source: ENI Statistics.

In view of the accentuated rigidity of the interchangeability of primary energy sources, and in spite of the development of natural gas, the market was able to make only limited use of the advantages deriving from the price differentials between the various sources. The petroleum cost therefore kept growing (from about 800 billion in 1970 to 17,600 in 1980) in spite of the reduction in the quantities imported (from 160 down to 97 million 1973-1980).

As we know, the difficulties in the sector caused a change in the role of the various operators on the Italian market essentially to the advantage of the ENI (through the AGIP [National Italian Oil Company]). Compared to a share of 20 percent in 1970, the ENI reached 40 percent in 1980; compared to domestic users only, this rate rose to approximately 47 percent, as you can see in Table E. The tendency continued in 1981 with 52 percent recorded during the first half. On top of these changes we have—for the domestic market—a structural burden due to the imbalance between refining yields and the make-up of the demand.

Table E.

		3 Millioni di t.	4 % su Committenze Nazionali	5 % su Committenze Totali
	1. Committenti Nazionali			
6	Agip	35,5	46,7	40,1
7	Multinazionali	31,3	41,2	34,5
8	Indipendenti	9,2	12,1	11,2
	Totale	76,0	100,0	85,8
	2. Committenti Esteri	12,6		14,2
9	Totale Generale	88,6		100,0

Legend: 1--Domestic customers; 2--Foreign customers; 3--Millions of tons; 4--% of domestic customers; 5--% of total customers; 6--Multinationals; 7--Independents; 8--Total; 9--Grand total.

As we can see from the following data, there is beginning to be a superabundance of medium and light distillates in production compared to a shortage of fuel oil with corresponding results in terms of exports and imports. The needs of the thermoelectric power plants are the main cause for the heavy demand for fuel oil which is typical of the Italian market (61 percent of the fuel oil in Italy was used for the generation of electric power as against 24 percent in Germany, 18 percent in Great Britain, and 25 percent in France).

The significance of the electrical share, calculated as the gross domestic consumption rate of energy sources used for the production and utilization of electric energy, in 1980 exceeded 28 percent, corresponding to about 192 billion kwh of which 186 went for domestic production and 6 went abroad. The electric energy demand kept increasing (up 2.8 percent over 1979) and the delays in launching a nuclear program have resulted in an increase in conventional thermoelectric power production.

The data in tables F and G show how this production represents 70 percent, approximately, of the total and how it is concentrated in the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] plants whose gross total electric output in 1980 came to 79 percent of the total.

Table F. Electric Energy Balance Sheet for Italy in 1980

	1	Idroe- lettrica	Termoelet- trica	Geoter- moelettrica	Nucleoter- moelettrica	Totale 5 milioni di kwh
				3	4	
a) Produzione lorda						
		35.036	106.940	2.672	2.208	146.856
6		4.117	1.882	—	—	5.999
7		387	426	—	—	813
8		7.971	24.102	—	—	32.073
9		47.511	133.350	2.672	2.208	185.741
b) Consumi per servizi ausiliari						
		214	6.294	103	140	6.751
6		18	93	—	—	111
7		1	21	—	—	22
8		36	1.429	—	—	1.465
9		269	7.837	103	140	8.349
c) Produzione netta						
10		39.307	102.840	2.569	2.068	146.784
8		7.935	22.673	—	—	30.608
9		47.242	125.513	2.569	2.068	177.392
	11	Importazioni				8.072
	12	Esportazioni				-1.980
	13	Pompaggi				-3.225
	14	Consumi più perdite				180.250

Legend: 1--Hydroelectric; 2--Thermoelectric; 3--Geothermal electric; 4--Nuclear thermoelectric; 5--Total, millions of kwh; 6--City-owned enterprises; 7--Miscellaneous enterprises; 8--In-house producers; 9--Total; 10--Public services [public utilities]; 11--Imports; 12--Exports; 13--Pumping; 14--Consumption plus loss; (a) Gross output; (b) Consumption for auxiliary services; (c) Net output.

Table G. Electric Energy Balance in Italy, 1979 and 1980

		2 1979 variazioni % GWh rispetto al '78		3 1980 variazioni % GWh rispetto al '79	
4	Produzione lorda:				
5	Idroelettrica (1)	48.212	+1,7	47.511	-1,5
6	Termoelettrica	127.924	+6,0	133.350	+4,2
7	Geotermoelettrica	2.500	+0,2	2.672	+6,9
8	Nucleotermoelettrica	2.628	-40,6	2.208	16,0
9	Produzione totale lorda	181.264	+5,1	185.741	+2,5
10	Energia destinata ai servizi ausiliari della produzione	8.007	+5,0	8.349	+4,3
11	Produzione netta	173.257	+3,5	177.392	+2,4
12	Energia destinata ai pompaggi	3.241	+17,2	3.225	-0,5
13	Energia importata	7.560	+47,5	8.072	+6,8
14	Energia esportata	2.167	-27,7	1.989	-8,2
15	Energia richiesta sulla rete	175.409	+5,2	180.250	+2,8

Legend: (1) Including 2,265 Gwh for 1978 and 2,268 for 1980 to be credited to water power contributions from pumping cycles; 2--1979 % changes, compared to 1978; 3--1980 % changes, compared to 1979; 4--Gross output; 5--Hydroelectric (1); 6--Thermoelectric; 7--Geothermoelectric; 8--Nuclear thermoelectric; 9--Total gross output; 10--Energy earmarked for auxiliary services for production; 11--Net output; 12--Energy earmarked for pumping; 13--Imported energy; 14--Exported energy; 15--Energy demanded from grid.

Compared to 1979, we can figure out how the increased electric energy imports concentrated for the water power and nuclear power output dropped by making thermoelectric energy alone cover the increased demand. Italy's biggest supplier was Switzerland, followed by France, as you can see in Table H.

Table H. Electric Energy Movements with Foreign Sources in 1980 (Gwh)

		1 Importazione	Movimenti fisici 2 Esportazione
3	Francia	1.426	736
4	Svizzera	5.210	1.159
	Austria	711	22
5	Jugoslavia	725	72
6	Totale	8.072	1.989
7	Saldo importatore	6.083	

Legend: 1--Imports; 2--Physical movement, exports; 3--France; 4--Switzerland; 5--Yugoslavia; 6--Total; 7--Import balance.

"Barrel of Yields"

	1980	Ge.	1
	GPL	2,2	
2	Virgin Nafta	4,6	4
3	Benzine	16,8	16,4
4	Petroli	4,2	4,4
5	Gasoli	28,0	28,8
6	Oli combustibili	40,3	39,7
7	Altri prodotti	3,9	3,8
8	Totale	100,0	100,0

Legend: 1--January-August 1981; 2--Original Naphtha; 3--Gasoline; 4--Petroleum; 5--Gas-oil; 6--Fuel oils; 7--Miscellaneous products; 8--Total.

"Barrel of Consumption:

	1980	Genn-Ago '81	1
	GPL	2,4	2,4
2	Virgin Nafta	4,7	4,9
3	Benzine	13,3	12,9
4	Petroli	2,8	2,4
5	Gasoli	26,3	25,6
6	Oli combustibili	46,3	44,8
7	Altri prodotti	4,2	7,1
8	Totale	100,0	100,0

Legend: 1--January-August 1981; 2--Original Naphtha; 3--Gasoline; 4--Petroleum; 5--Gas-oil; 6--Fuel oils; 7--Miscellaneous products; 8--Total.

In the development of thermoelectric energy in 1980, a special effort was made for the use of coal; this effort was continued during the first half of 1981 with increased consumption (up 19 percent) compared to the same period of time in 1980. Hydrocarbons and petroleum products in particular maintained their net predominance over the production of thermoelectric energy in spite of the decline in natural gas. Table I shows the 1980 consumption figures, distributed by primary energy sources and figures in terms of petroleum equivalent. We can see that nuclear electric power output is still on minimum levels and these levels are lower than those of geothermal energy production, showing a noticeable decrease as compared to the 1979 figures. The total effective and net power of electric power generating plants installed in Italy as of the end of 1980 was, respectively, about 48,500 and 46,800 Mw, with ENEL accounting for a share of 78 percent.

Table I. Electric Energy Production in Italy Broken Down by Energy Sources (Mtep [Millions of Tons of Petroleum Equivalent])

	1979		2	1980	Var. %
1	Totale	ENEL	Terzi	3 Totale	4 del totale rispetto al 1979
5	Termoelettrica tradizionale da:				
6	Combustibili solidi e gas derivati:				
7	carbone	2,25	2,94	0,02	2,96 +31,6
	lignite	0,34	0,32	—	0,32 -5,9
8	gas derivati	0,73	0,02	0,74	0,76 +4,1
9	altri combustibili	0,18	..	0,16	0,16 -11,1
10	Totale (a)	3,50	3,28	0,92	4,20 +20,0
11	Idrocarburi:				
12	prodotti petroliferi	21,90	18,80	4,12	22,92 +4,6
13	gas naturale	2,39	1,42	0,54	1,96 -18,0
10	Totale (b)	24,29	20,22	4,66	24,88 +2,4
14	Totale termoelettrica (a) + (b)	27,79	23,50	5,58	29,08 +4,6
15	Produzione idroelettrica naturale	10,11	7,22	2,74	9,96 -1,5
16	Produzione geotermoelettrica	0,55	0,59	—	0,59 +7,3
17	Produzione elettronucleare	0,58	0,49	—	0,49 -15,5
18	Totale produzione	39,03	31,80	8,32	40,12 +2,8

Legend: 1--Total; 2--Third parties; 3--Total; 4--Percentage variation of total compared to 1979; 5--Conventional thermoelectric energy from; 6--Solid fuel and derived gases; 7--Coal; 8--Derived gases; 9--Miscellaneous fuels; 10--Total (a); 11--Hydrocarbons; 12--Petroleum products; 13--Natural gas; 14--Total thermoelectric (a) + (b); 15--Natural hydroelectric production; 16--Geothermal geoelectric production; 17--Nuclear electric production; 18--Total output.

Note. To transform thermoelectric energy, we used the real input of the Italian power plants while for primary electric energy (from water power, geothermal and nuclear) we used a constant conversion coefficient (2,200 kcal/kwh).

Conversion to coal has already been performed for thermoelectric power plants for a power output of about 5,000 Mw, while it is in progress or planned for the other 3,500 Mw. Overall, we anticipate the conversion to the use of coal as fuel for about 40 percent of the net power available as of the end of 1980. Details for this power output are shown in Table L.

Table L. Effective Power (Mw) as of 31 December 1980

Implant	1	2	Lorda	2	Netta
		Italia	ENEL	Italia	ENEL
5	Idroelettrici	15.904	12.595	15.816	12.538
6	Termoelettrici	30.654	23.353	29.146	22.196
7	Geotermoelettrici	440	440	428	428
8	Nucleotermoelettrici	1.471	1.471	1.424	1.424
9	Totale	48.469	37.859	46.814	36.586

Legend: 1—Plants; 2—Italy; 3—Gross; 4—Net; 5—Hydroelectric; 6—Thermoelectric; 7—Geothermoelectric; 8—Nuclear thermoelectric; 9—Total.

In long-range terms, meeting the additional electric energy demand has been assigned to new ENEL plants for about 16,500 Mw and for about 1,000 Mw for plants belonging to other producers, giving us a total of 17,500 Mw, furnished by plants on which work is in progress or planned. Here is a detailed breakdown of these future power figures:

ENEL (*)	(Mw)
Hydroelectric	5,148
Conventional thermoelectric	8,008
Geothermoelectric	60
Turbogas	810
Nuclear	2,438
	16,464

(*) In the case of hydroelectric power plants, we are dealing with the power available during the wintertime peak; for the other plants, this is the effective net power.

While we can detect an effort in the nuclear sector, we must mention however that 50 percent of the new plants will still be of the conventional thermoelectric type. As a matter of fact, the long time needed not only for the construction of these plants but also for decisions pertaining to nuclear power plants led to the use of conventional power plants while making maximum use of hydroelectric power potential residues plus the contribution from turbogas groups (which are faster to install).

In concluding the summary presented here for the ENI Report on Energy, pertaining to the international and the Italian markets, we present here the structure and development of domestic electric energy consumption over the past 5-year term.

The data furthermore confirm the greater dynamics to be found in consumption for domestic use and for services in general, compared to the development of the demand for production sectors which have been penalized by recent economic difficulties.

Table M. Electric Energy Consumption in Italy (Gwh)

Settore	3	1975	1979	1980	Variazione	t.m.a.
		4 (consunt.)	4 (consunt.)	4 (consunt.)	5 1980/1979 (%)	6 1975/1980 (%)
7	Industria	79.160	96.125	97.303	+ 1,2	+ 4,2
8	Trasporti (1)	4.045	4.445	4.499	+ 1,2	+ 2,2
9	Usi domestici	27.878	36.604	38.109	+ 4,1	+ 6,5
10	Agricoltura	1.646	2.519	2.594	+ 3,0	+ 9,5
11	Altri usi	15.910	20.319	21.139	+ 4,0	+ 5,8
12	di cui:					
13	(illuminazione pubblica)	(1.979)	(2.455)	(2.548)	+ 3,8	+ 5,2
14	(commercio alberghi,					
15	ristoranti e bar, servizi)	(9.217)	(11.944)	(12.539)	+ 5,0	+ 6,3
16	(pubblica amministrazione)	(1.042)	(1.238)	(1.305)	+ 5,4	+ 4,6
17	(oleodotti e gasdotti,					
18	acquedotti)	(2.722)	(3.274)	(3.253)	- 0,6	+ 3,6
18	(altri settori) (2)	(950)	(1.408)	(1.494)	+ 6,1	+ 9,5
19	Totale consumi finali	128.639	160.012	163.644	+ 2,3	+ 4,9
20	Perdite di trasmissione distribuzione	12.622	15.397	16.606	+ 7,9	+ 5,6
21	Energia richiesta	141.261	175.409	180.250	+ 2,8	+ 5,0

(1) Trasporti ferroviari ed urbani

(2) Credito e assicurazioni, comunicazioni, attività ausiliarie dei trasporti

FONTE: ENEL

Legend: (1) Railroad and urban transportation; (2) Loans and insurance, communications; transportation support activities; 3--Sector; 4--Consumed; 5--Change, 1980 as against 1979; 6--Average annual rate, 1975-1980; 7--Industry; 8--Transportation (1); 9--Domestic uses; 10--Agriculture; 11--Miscellaneous uses; 12--Including; 13--Public lighting; 14--Commerce, hotels; 15--Restaurants and bars, services; 16--Public administration; 17--Oil pipelines, gas pipelines, water pipelines; 18--Miscellaneous sectors (2); 19--Total final consumption; 20--Transmission distribution losses; 21--Energy demanded.

Source: ENEL.

5058

CSO: 3104/221

ENERGY PROJECTS PROMINENT IN FINNISH, NORWEGIAN TALKS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 May 82 p 27

[Article: "Economic Agreement Being Considered Between Finland and Norway"]

[Text] In the future Finland and Norway intend to tighten their economic cooperation. A working group of officials will be established for the two countries to clarify the opportunities for accomplishing the same kind of economic agreement that already exists between Norway and Sweden between the two countries.

The tightening of cooperation between Finland and Norway, which has been unofficially discussed for some time already, received impetus when Norway's Trade and Maritime Transport Minister Arne Skaugen came to negotiate with Finnish decisionmakers on Thursday in Helsinki. Minister Skaugen arrived in Finland for a quick 2-day visit on Wednesday evening.

Even though Finland and Norway have good and stable trade relations, cooperative economic projects have not yet been mapped out. The accomplishment of an economic agreement between the countries would especially facilitate commerce to third-party countries. Cooperation could be pursued particularly in the area of marine technology.

Skaugen stated on Thursday that Finland and Norway have good opportunities for cooperation especially in Northern Norway when the area's gas and oil deposits will be exploited at the end of this decade.

Exploitation of Oil in the Barents Sea

Norway is expressing great interest in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union also. Norway recently negotiated with the Soviets on the exploitation of Barents Sea oil at a meeting of the joint economic commission of these two countries.

According to Trade Minister Skaugen Finland and Norway could possibly work together when the Soviet Union begins to exploit the wealth of the Barents Sea.

The difficulty in Finnish and Norwegian transactions with the Soviet Union could be that Finland conducts bilateral transactions and Norway, for its

part, conducts normal currency-based transactions with the Soviet Union. According to the Norwegians issues could, however, be resolved through negotiations.

At this time the most interesting and concrete question of cooperation in Finnish trade with Norway is Outokumpu's offer to build and deliver a ferro-chromium plant to Tyssedal in Southern Norway. The cost of the chromium plant, which will produce 100,000 tons annually, will be approximately 300 million markkas.

The chromium plant has in principle progressed so far that the only thing lacking is the approval of the Norwegian Parliament for this transaction, stated Skaugen.

Balance of Trade Is No Problem

The trade imbalance between Finland and Norway is not according to Skaugen such a problem that a fuss should be raised over it. This trade represents a surplus of several billion kroner to Finland.

The balancing of trade will not be accomplished as the result of one official visit, but it will require cooperation on both sides, stated Skaugen.

On Thursday Minister Skaugen met with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, Foreign Minister Par Stenback, and Trade and Industry Ministry Esko Ollila.

Skaugen conducted actual negotiations with Foreign Trade Minister Esko Rekola, who also invited him to visit Finland.

Today Minister Skaugen will visit Wartsila's Helsinki Shipyard where he will familiarize himself with the luxury liner being built for the Norwegians and he will also visit Outokumpu's Geological Research Station in the Olari district of Espoo.

10576

CSO: 3107/117

SAARTO WANTS LIBERAL PARTY, STALINISTS IN NEXT GOVERNMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 May 82 p 3

[Article: "Taistoites and Liberal Party in Government"]

[Text] On Sunday Chairman Viekko Saarto of the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] Parliamentary Faction proposed that the present four-party government be supplemented by the Finnish Communist Party's Taistoites as well as the Liberal Party before next spring's elections. In this way the government base would include the whole left and the whole center, argued Saarto. The government is presently made up the SDP, Center Party, the RKP [Swedish Peoples Party], and the majority wing of the SKDL.

"It is quite possible that Sorsa's government will still be needed even after the elections next March. Changes in the People's Democratic movement as well as the merger of the Center Party and the Liberals should be taken into consideration after the elections at the latest. Would it not be more reasonable to take into consideration the expansion of the government's base immediately after the SKP's extraordinary congress and the meetings of the Center Party as well as the LKP [Liberal Peoples Party], " stated Saarto in Helsinki.

He pointed out that until now the SKDL has been in the government with the support of 24 MP's. After the unification of the parliamentary faction the number will change to 35. According to Saarto the issue still requires the confirmation of the congress.

Taistoite MP Ensio Laine stated on Sunday regarding Saarto's proposal that Taistoite support for the government will depend on how the goals for government policies will be defined at the SKP's congress next weekend. According to Laine there have so far been differing opinions on these goals.

10576

CSO: 3107/117

'THIRD LINE' AND SKDL SEEK TO HEAL RIFT AFTER CP CONGRESS

Conservative Paper Views Congress

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 17 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Finnish Communists Swedimize"]

[Text] The special SKP (Finnish Communist Party) congress held at the end of the week bore witness to a Swedimized Finnish Communist movement. At the present time there are probably in Sweden about 20 different communist or socialist factions which, for narrow ideological reasons, go their own ways without making room for cooperation among themselves.

The special SKP congress clearly demonstrated that there are well over a half a dozen policy lines, and in part factions as well, among the Finnish Communists. Evidently only for purely tactical reasons, these factions still manage to survive inside the two in part overlapping party organizations.

The divided and in part incredibly confused party congress, however, came up with a resolution which at best contains the seed for slow improvement of cooperation. Since Labor Minister Jouko Kajanoja rather than Arvo Aalto was elected new chairman of the SKP, this is clearly a breakthrough for a new policy. It will largely depend on Kalanoja whether this resolution remains merely an affirmative gesture of whether it comprises the beginning of a new course of action. However, he does not have much time.

Thus the congress' nominations were in every other respect a bitter defeat for the contending minority faction led by Taisto Sinisalo. It is quite understandable that some change in the dispute that has been going on for a decade must be achieved. The chief minority faction representatives in the party leadership organs have followed the same line of thinking the majority faction led by Aarne Saarinen has in vain exhibited for years. This favorable attitude has at any rate not increased harmony between the two and this is why the minority has now been forced into a corner where there are not many alternatives: conforming to party rules or either isolation within the party or withdrawal from it to form their own miniparty.

It is quite understandable that the last-mentioned alternative does not appeal to Sinisalo's troops; it would throw the party into a tailspin. It is just as understandable that Saarinen and Aalto have striven to achieve this with their uncompromising behavior because it would solve the SKP's problems.

The SKP has chosen a typical Eurocommunist line in Finland. It is hard for the party to abandon this line any more because it is also the line endorsed by a broad mass of supporters. On the other hand, we must admit that Sinisalo is right about the fact that that line no longer has much to do with the kind of orthodox communism that recognizes the Soviet Communist Party's (NKP) leading worldwide ideological position.

The message sent to the NKP congress scarcely produced the intended result, which probably at least indicates to those who signed the letter that the Stalinists' tactical insights are not at any rate tactically the best possible ones. Rather this widened the gap in the coalition and united majority members and those seeking a third course of action.

Never before have SKP leaders mounted such pointed criticism of their brother party. Publicly expressed, this can hardly be completely ignored in NKP circles with a shrug of the shoulders. It is probably just as likely that it will in no way wreck relations between these parties, in the development of which new men will have their chance and they certainly want to offer them that chance too. It is also obvious that the SKP is not yet about to break up right after tomorrow night either.

GDR Congratulates New Chairman, Aalto

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 May 82 p 8

[Text] The German Socialist Unity Party (SED) Central Committee has sent telegrams containing greetings and congratulations to the SKP's new chairman, Jouko Kajanoja, and first secretary Arvo Aalto on his reelection.

In telegrams with the same content signed by SED first secretary Eric Honecker, he said: "On behalf of the German SED Central Committee and myself, I offer you our congratulations on your election. We wish you success in your work, good health and creative power."

Party's 'Third Line' Seeks Settlement

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 May 82 p 9

[Text] During the Communists' special congress the party's so-called "Third Line," which has been raised to the top, has been working out compromises by means of which the minority faction may be included in the party leadership.

Selected by the SKP Central Committee, Leevi Lehto, Juhani Ruotsalo and Pertti Rovamo, who, however, have refrained from performing their Central Committee duties, have made a proposal to resolve the party dispute which has come to a head.

In line with the proposal, "some comrades from the so-called minority faction" would be invited to sit on the Central Committee and these would have the right to speak and submit proposals at meetings and, as necessary, the right to have their opinions recorded in the minutes of the meeting.

While still fresh, the proposal has not met with any response in the minority faction where they remember that first secretary Arvo Aalto had offered the same sort of solution to SKP disputes.

Lehto, Ruotsalo and Rovamo further propose that the SKP Politburo get started on preparations for the 20th SKP Congress, to be held in January 1984.

The SKP's disputes came to a head last Friday and Saturday at the special congress which, after colorful vicissitudes, elected Jouko Kajanoja as the new party chairman and Arvo Aalto to continue as first secretary.

Following the congress decisions, the Stalinists announced that they would stay out of the Central Committee and the Politburo. Furthermore, Member of Parliament Seppo Toivainen announced that he does not intend to assume the duties of vice chairman, to which post the party majority has elected him.

After the congress was over, Stalinist leader Taisto Sinisalo accused the majority faction of pursuing a policy of discrimination and punishment. On Tuesday the Stalinist TIEDONANTAJA shoved responsibility for the failure of the party congress onto the treachery of the so-called Third Line.

On Tuesday members of the so-called Third Line contested all accusations of treachery, accused the Stalinists and announced that Jouko Kajanoja had just drafted a solution which in practice would turn out to be a vindication of the faction.

Lehto, Ruotsalo and Rovamo also announced that they were on no account trying to influence the position of the pointer on the scales, but were rather "striving to shape a common understanding of the situation that is as broad as possible from one matter to the next." In their opinion, a special congress would inevitably be a new national spectacle.

All the Stalinists have refused to sit on the new SKP Central Committee. So far, Lehto, Ruotsalo, Rovamo and Nils Torvalds as well as alternate member Tapio Kangas have refrained from participating in Central Committee activities.

Negotiations for a settlement to correct the divisive outcome of the SKP integration meeting are to begin this week. SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja has announced that his position is for the party to be integrated again at the next Central Committee meeting on 4 June.

SKDL Seeks to Isolate Self from Dispute

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 May 82 p 9

[Article: "SKP Disputes Will Not Be Brought to SKDL Congress"]

[Text] Personal disputes in the SKP along with the boycotts they incur will not extend to the coming Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) congress. At least this is what SKDL leaders believe. According to them, the SKDL congress is being prepared on an entirely different basis and the Stalinists have also participated in the preparations.

The SKDL congress, held every 3 years, is to begin in Kuopio on 28 May. At it, leaders will be elected and a policy line will be decided on. At a press conference held in Helsinki on Wednesday, Kalevi Kivisto, reelected chairman of the SKDL, stressed the fact that preparations for a special agenda meeting, during which they would attempt to consider what is known about the society and how it is likely to affect SKDL policy, were made at the meeting.

"Preparations have been in progress throughout the entire width and breadth of the SKDL," Kivisto noted. According to him, there is nothing to indicate that SKP special congress disputes and deadlocked positions will be brought to the SKDL congress in Kuopio. According to Kivisto, no powerful pressures have been evident in the choosing of candidates.

At the end of the week Aarne Saarinen, who was elected to the SKDL leadership as a demonstration of trusting relations between Communists and Socialists, left his post as vice chairman of the SKDL.

According to Kivisto, a feeling of trust is today so self-evident that it is not absolutely necessary for the new SKP chairman, Jouko Kajanoja, to assume Saarinen's post.

"Saarinen's post is in the hands of the SKDL congress," Kivisto asserted. Communist Jorma Hentila, who is also a member of the SKP Central Committee, will probably stay on as first secretary of the SKDL.

Depending on how they are counted, from 16 to 22 percent of those attending the SKDL congress will be Stalinists. The Student Movement and Youth League have been integrated. In Hentila's judgment, Youth League representatives and students will strive to achieve amicable cooperation beyond old factional lines at the congress.

According to Kivisto, elections of officials are going on within more or less the same framework as before and he did not believe that the Stalinists were being excluded from SKDL activities.

The SKDL does not intend to make any life style decisions at the coming congress, although, according to SKDL leaders, they do otherwise plan to turn the congress into a new kind of party congress. "We are not going to try to regulate people's life styles. Nor is it a question of whether a person leads a

clean life or not either. We will make an effort to discuss those changes in life style that have taken place, although they seem to have remained unnoticed by the parties," Hentila described the coming congress.

Kivisto emphasized that the goal is a party congress new in content and form. "The goal is not to make a decision on life style."

The party cells have submitted 113 initiatives for the SKDL congress which run from a model for democracy on the job and wage-earner funds to the removal of parliamentary representatives from the decision-making body.

SKDL Socialists Form Separate Organ

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 May 82 p 3

[Text] SKDL Socialists are organizing their own group. The Socialist Executive Committee reached a decision on the matter on Saturday. They plan to make the detailed arrangements after the congress at the end of next week.

According to the Socialist Executive Committee chairman, bank director Ele Alenius, the Socialists want to increase their own stake in the SKDL by organizing themselves.

According to Alenius, organization of the Socialists will brighten the SKDL's image at home as well as abroad. In Alenius' opinion, an SKDL that is an organization of cooperation between Communists and Socialists would be felt to be too much of a Communist cover organization.

After the SKDL congress, the Socialists plan to set up their own organizations as their own connecting links in the SKDL districts. For example, the SKDL Socialists' share of the congress to be held in Kuopio is about a fifth of the total, or 50 of the 270 congress delegates.

The SKDL Socialists have been getting ready to organize themselves for a long time. Parliamentary Representative Ilkka-Cristian Bjorklund has enthusiastically promoted organization alongside Alenius.

On Saturday Bjorklund, who is close to Alenius, criticized the SKDL chairman, Education Minister Kalevi Kivisto, in the chief SKDL-SKP party organ, KANSAN UUTISET. Socialist Kivisto became chairman of the SKDL in 1979, following Alenius. In Bjorklund's opinion, in Kivisto's hands the SKDL has been cast adrift.

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CSO: 3107/121

MAX JAKOBSEN LOOKS AT POST-KEKKONEN ERA FOREIGN RELATIONS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 May 82 p 2

[Commentary by Max Jakobsen]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto's recent state visit to Sweden may well mark the beginning of a new era and better understanding between Finland and the other Nordic countries. The reason, of course, is not that Koivisto has succeeded Urho Kekkonen, but rather that developments in Finland in recent time have made Finnish politics less different and, thus, less foreign to Scandinavians.

I have long experience in attempting to explain the mysteries of Finnish politics to Scandinavians and I have come to the conclusion that the difficulties may be classified under three topics: the power of the president, the significance of being the neighbor of a superpower, and the strength of the Communist Party.

All three factors remain in the political landscape of Finland, but they are changing in a way that should make the scene less exotic to Scandinavian eyes.

It is probable that the formal authority of the president will remain intact, even if he is limited to two terms of office, but we probably will see no counterpart to the extraordinary personal influence practiced by Kekkonen during the greater part of a quarter century.

Koivisto already has made known that he intends to strengthen the parliamentary nature of the Finnish system. Apparently, he wants to let the government and parliament rule the country under normal conditions, while retaining the authority of the presidency to be used in times of crisis.

Without doubt, this understanding of the president's role reflects Koivisto's own temperament and his own convictions, but he also is making a virtue out of a necessity: any attempt to imitate Kekkonen's authoritative behavior would conflict with the spirit of the times.

The break with previous practice is most clearly perceptible in the area of foreign policy. Koivisto is willing to share the power of shaping foreign

policy with the government. In this way, the division of responsibility is expanded. As a result, Finland's foreign policy will seem more "normal" in the eyes of the world. Unfortunately, it also may become less disciplined and less creative than during the glory days of Kekkonen.

The mystical power cultivated by Kekkonen was due primarily to his control over relations with Moscow. Koivisto has initiated a demystification process.

In reality, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union have been institutionalized for some time. This development was welcomed by the Soviet Union, which refutes the popular myth that Moscow prefers relations of a personal nature. Today the Soviet Union is most anxious to maintain stability in its relations with Finland and stability can be guaranteed only by institutions.

Such changes in the exercise of foreign policy do not necessitate a reexamination of the relative strength of various powers in our part of the world. Finnish politicians will continue to show restraint in their comments on Soviet policies. They should not give way to the type of complacent emotional gestures practiced by their counterparts in the other Nordic countries during times of crisis in East-West relations.

The difference is in words rather than in content, however. Relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe have developed in such a way that the gap between Finland and the rest of the Western world has decreased. After a difficult period, in which the term "Finlandization" came into general use, there are now signs that the basic features of Finnish politics are better understood, not just in Scandinavia, but also in countries such as West Germany and France.

It may seem paradoxical that the consolidation of Finnish-Soviet relations has run parallel with a continued weakening of communism in Finland. Actually, this is no paradox. Since January 1940 when Stalin relegated Otto Kuusinen's puppet regime to oblivion, Soviet policy has consistently placed Finnish national interests above ideological ambitions. Today this is a deeply conservative policy designed to maintain the status quo and the fate of the local communist party has no relevance in this connection.

The Communist Party still is much stronger in Finland than in the remaining Nordic countries: the latest Gallup poll indicates that it is supported by 16 percent of the voters. But this figure is misleading. The majority of the party presently consists of a reformist fraction closely aligned with the Social Democrats, while the militant group cannot count on more than 2 to 3 percent of the votes in an election.

In reality, although not yet formally, the Finnish party structure has become similar to the structure that predominates in Scandinavia--a triumph for the strategy developed by Urho Kekkonen in 1966 when he proclaimed that the integration of the communists in Finland into the parliamentary system was the goal of his policies.

SKDL YOUTH GROUP ELECTS HARRI MOISIO NEW CHAIRMAN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 May 82 p 12

[Article: "New Leader for SKDL Youth"]

[Text] Oulu--Harri Moisio, 27, a student from Vaasa, was elected as the new chairman of the Finnish Democratic Youth League on Sunday in Oulu. He succeeds Markku Karkkainen, who after leading the league for 6 years announced that he is giving up his chairmanship.

New vice chairmen were also elected for the league at the federated meeting of the Finnish Democratic Youth League. These positions were filled by Marko Auer, Seppo Wikstom, and Merja Hannus from Helsinki. The selections were unanimous. The meeting approved a political program of action for the league. Its main content is a strengthening of the struggle for a "new democracy".

In the employment stand approved at the meeting forceful and immediate employment actions were demanded from enterprises and the state.

The meeting gave its full support to the development of UUSI VALTA, the joint newspaper of the youth and student leagues established at the beginning of this year. The meeting was characterized by an exceptionally forceful self-criticism and a rejection of traditional factional disputes.

The meeting unanimously approved an appeal for unity in the Finnish Communist Party. In the appeal it was stated that the SDNL [Finnish Democratic Youth League] is capable of resolving the remaining factional problems. It is hoped that this development will also help the SKP's extraordinary congress to achieve positive results.

In the appeal it was also stated that the SDNL is for a unified and healthy Communist Party. "However, if the SKP splits, the youth league will not support any kind of a splinter party," states the appeal.

The meeting also adopted a stand on the construction of a new 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant. The majority of the representatives voted for an organizational discussion of the issue. The counterproposal was a negative stand regarding the construction of the nuclear power plant.

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CSO: 3107/117

LAURENT ON PCF PROBLEMS, ACTION PLAN IN BUSINESS, INDUSTRY

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 May 82 pp 6-7

[Report by Paul Laurent to the PCF Central Committee meeting at Saclas; date not specified]

[Text] Dear comrades,

This Central Committee meeting to discuss problems with the party's organization, the life of its cells, and the activity of Communists is being held in response to a pressing need.

In recent years, we have often dealt with those problems from very diverse angles: there have been several sessions by the Central Committee, a meeting by the National Council devoted to the firms, a very complete sociological study of party members, and the 24th congress, which carried out an important updating of the party's bylaws. The question of developing the party's democratic life, the value and updating of democratic centralism, and the permanent recruitment effort, the priority given to activity in the firms, and the efforts aimed at better activity in the cells--all of that has occupied a major place in the thinking and action of Communists. Most of the ideas and decisions coming out of all those occasions have retained their value.

But we cannot stop there. The discussions I have just recalled took place in a period of major political change. Our party was engaged in strategic reflection that found its most complete expression in our 24th congress. At the same time, political events were starting to move faster, ending in the victory of 10 May and the formation of a leftist government with the participation of Communist ministers. That political change was accompanied by a severe setback to our party's electoral influence. In those conditions, it is understandable that the impact of certain directives concerning party organization did not attract enough attention--that they became blurred.

But above all, we need a new discussion that will take the directives of our 24th congress and the new political situation fully into account.

Today we need a thorough discussion of the organization and life of the French Communist Party in the France of today--in the new situation that we have been experiencing for a year--so as to implement the strategy of the 24th congress.

"Mass activity in a new style that will reflect a strategy of revolutionary impact in life: that is the entire answer to the problems facing us." That is what the resolution of the 24th congress states, and it adds: "But that answer would be nothing without a revolutionary party capable of opening up the path to a socialism of self-management."

A French Communist Party that is equal to the fundamentally new political situation and in which the strategy of the 24th congress is being implemented--that, in our opinion, is the indispensable means of bringing about the political and social movement that is absolutely necessary to the democratic advance to French-style socialism.

From that standpoint, where do we stand?

Where Do We Stand?

Since the end of 1979, our party has had over 700,000 members--more than 710,000 at the end of 1981. We have 27,500 cells, of which 9,500 are in the firms. That is an incomparable force in which the personality of hundreds of thousands of workers of both sexes asserts itself in reflection and action for the innovative transformation of French society.

Of course, the harshness of the struggle and the political and ideological battle and, quite simply, the difficulties of life result in fluctuations in our ranks. But--and this is the essential point--we have made considerable progress since the early 1970's toward becoming a major mass party that is widely representative of the working class and of manual and intellectual workers in all categories. Hundreds of thousands of new members have taken their place in our ranks and have held their place with honor, alongside the older members, in the complex struggles of the recent past.

A complete sociological study of the party's makeup was made in 1979, and it came up with eloquent figures: 270,000 workers belonging to the various components of the working class account for over half of the active individuals currently belonging to the party. In our ranks we have 80,000 intellectuals in all disciplines, over 250,000 women (almost three times as many as in 1966), and over 80,000 people under the age of 25. Among us there are nearly 100,000 members who joined before 1948, witnessing to the depth and continuity of communist commitment.

And while the party's membership has been growing, the party's democratic life has also been developing through enrichment of the practice of democratic centralism.

Respect for the main rules of democratic centralism--free and thorough discussion and majority decisions that are binding upon all, although this does not exclude the right to retain a different point of view--has made it possible, while resolutely combating any recourse to the impoverishing system of competing lines of thought, to bring about aware and creative participation by members in the drafting and implementation of our policy.

It is not monolithism which characterizes the party, but the affirmation of all personalities. The important revision of our bylaws in 1979 brought even further improvements to the resources for democratic life in the party through greater insistence on the role of the cell and its duties and those of party leaders with respect to the members, as well as greater stress on the role and means of information among Communists through the running of discussion columns at times other than those surrounding congresses and by establishing the Party National Council.

There are solid reasons, therefore, for confidence in the party's present forces, its vitality, its strong roots among the people, and its unity, which have withstood the tough political and ideological battles of recent years.

Advances and Delays

But that is no reason to swim in self-satisfaction. While the party's organization experienced the progress that I have just cited during the 1970's, everything was not flawless. Basically, an examination of the flaws leads back to the conclusions we drew from the period of the Common Program. All action was directed toward a political agreement at the summit, based on a particular program and leading up to an election victory that would permit the implementation of the common commitments. Since all action was directed "upward"--and regardless of our efforts to support that action with the most active people's intervention possible--it is now obvious that "downward" activity in the cells, aimed at the masses and intended to raise the level of the struggles and win people over to the social, economic, and political means to be implemented to advance toward French-style socialism, suffered from that political orientation. The attention paid to the political life of each cell, the link with each member, and the initiatives to be undertaken in the firms and neighborhoods to broaden action on all levels and amplify the political debate weakened.

This was all the more harmful in that it corresponded in time with a sizable inflow of new members whose full participation in party activity was not considered an issue of prime importance--as though everything was supposed to take care of itself once the member had joined up. At a time when the ideological battle was redoubling in intensity and French society was undergoing profound upheavals, there was a considerable gap in the very notion of party activity, and it was tied to the inadequacies of our strategy. Our progress in terms of membership may have helped to blur those inadequacies, by the way.

So we arrive at this clear conclusion: our party represents a considerable force, an irreplaceable achievement in our people's revolutionary fight to go forward on the path to socialism. But complete mastery of the strategy of the 24th congress, the new political situation resulting from the victory in May 1981, and the persistent defects in our activity demand new and major progress in the party's organizational work.

Effort Demanded by Our Strategy

I will tackle this issue from three different angles at once:

First, what kind of party do we need today?

Second, what major shortcomings do we have to overcome?

Third, what must we do in the immediate future to make progress?

1. As has been said before, implementing the strategy of the 24th congress presupposes a new style of mass work by Communists: a strengthening of the party's ties with the workers--with people--not only in order to listen and understand better, but also, obviously, to make ourselves better understood.

2. We are operating in a new situation in the government and in the country to implement the common commitments. This creates better conditions for adopting a constructive attitude on all levels: a will to make specific progress at every moment and to rally the necessary forces for adding more achievements and laying the foundations for later progress. But this obviously requires a considerable effort at adaptation on the part of the party, which since 1947 has known no situation other than one of resolute opposition to a reactionary policy. Although even that situation has never prevented us from experiencing certain limited positive advances or measures.

3. The very existence of the possibilities for democratic advance that are involved in the new situation sharpens the class struggle and the bitter character of the political and ideological fight. This can be measured by the excess and even extremism of certain stands recently taken by spokesmen for the Right. It can also be measured by the aggressive attitude of the employers. Jean Daniel can quote Tocqueville concerning the stopping of "class warfare" all he likes: the stakes are there, and they call for great speed and high quality in political activity by the party and the Communists to checkmate the reactionary forces and make our positions known.

4. Lastly, it must be kept in mind that only the extent to which we are widely established--the vitality of the party organizations--is likely to counterbat-
ter the means of ideological warfare adopted by the opponents of change.

There is no substitute or replacement gimmick for such activity.

A mass Communist Party present everywhere and in every field.

A Communist Party more strongly anchored in the firms, which are the center of gravity for the people's movement.

That is what is required by our strategy and the situation brought about by 10 May. Those are the three objectives that I would now like to recommend to the Central Committee.

1. Mass Party Everywhere

I would like to recall right from the start what Georges Marchais said at our last session. After recalling our government commitment and the spirit of initiative, loyalty, and efficiency that characterizes it at all levels, he added: "We have never had and we do not have the illusion that it will be possible to meet the country's expectations without an unrelenting struggle to remove the obstacles, overcome the difficulties, and introduce the necessary changes unless, to see all that happen, the workers become involved in the struggle against the forces of antichange. We forcefully stressed this at the congress: the people's movement cannot delegate to anyone the role that is its own--that of actor in the social transformations. Change cannot move forward unless our people themselves take responsibility for the problems presenting themselves--without the people's active intervention. And it is to the fostering of that intervention that we will devote our efforts.

"In the new situation born of the Right's defeat in the spring of 1981, the correct path consists of seizing every opportunity to advance in the direction of change, wherever those opportunities exist and no matter how limited they are, at the same pace as the people's movement itself. The correct path consists of proposing, on a case-by-case basis, the proper solutions and initiatives that are likely to succeed and thus to achieve successes which, even though partial, are significant, bring improvements, strengthen change, and indicate, at the same time, the path to follow.

"We are reaching a time when it is necessary for the party in its entirety to gauge even better the significance of this approach--that it become permeated with it--in order to make the policy of the 24th congress progressively more and more a part of life."

It is perfectly obvious that such an orientation requires Communists and party organizations that live closer to people's concerns and in close contact with people. They must listen to the workers and, at the same time, be capable of participating fully in the debate of ideas, insure the spread of our policy through increased dissemination of L'HUMANITE and effective propaganda, and increase their initiatives for giving the people's movement an increasingly active character.

What that means--does it need to be emphasized?--is not only activity by the party and its organizations as such, but also significant activity by Communists in the union movement and in the life of other associations while strictly respecting the bylaws and programs of those associations.

There Are not Enough of Us

Before even bringing up the question of the content and character of that activity, we must note one obvious fact. If that activity is to be fully responsive to the needs of the situation, many Communists and many cells are needed. Without a doubt, the absence or weakness of a communist cell in a firm or neighborhood or the absence or poor distribution of our press means leaving the field open, or almost open, to the ravages of the dominant ideology. Thinking

otherwise means thinking that our ideas, proposals, and assessments are conveyed through mysterious channels whose existence we have not discovered. Nothing can replace preparation, discussion, knowledge, and propaganda in connection with Communist policy by the Communists themselves.

If we examine the state of our organized forces in terms of the needs of the struggle, we reach an obvious conclusion: there are not enough of us, and we do not have enough cells. Saying that in no way indicates an underestimation of our current forces. But at the same time, we must see how those forces are distributed. Obviously, our organizations are powerful in some cities, firms, and villages. Through the years they have become established to a remarkable degree, and in general, that goes hand in hand with strong political influence by our party. But at the same time, there are so many firms and communes--sometimes important ones--where no cells exist or where the existing cells are weak. At the same time, we cannot fail to note that in firms where the party exists and is active, there are often entire sectors where we are not organized. And the same is true of certain neighborhoods in large communes and among certain wage earning categories as crucial as that of the clerical workers, for example, where we are still weak.

So it is not a matter of talking in generalities about our 710,000 members. What we must understand is that we are far from having an overabundance.

The correct concept of a mass party must be living, offensive, and creative.

New Questions Raised by Social Changes

At the 24th congress, we rightly discussed the far-reaching changes and even upheavals in French society over the past few decades. A great deal of our political reflection was devoted to taking that reality more completely into account. We cannot fail to see that such a development also presents us with major organizational problems. Over the past 30 years or so, we have witnessed a considerable development of urbanization, particularly in large housing developments, and the establishment of a sizable number of big industrial firms, offices, and commercial enterprises--all of it in new areas and new sectors. Scientific and technological progress has brought genuine changes in the structure of the working class. The situation of skilled workers and technicians is much more important, and the number of working women has increased, as has the importance of the tertiary sector, commercial mergers, and certain new branches of industry. The growth of secondary and university education has brought vast groups of people together. The economic crisis has made unemployment a mass phenomenon. Millions of immigrants have come to live in our country. New lifestyles are creating contradictory phenomena. To take only one recent example, the increase in automobile ownership is creating new development in the old villages, especially those surrounding middle-sized cities.

Of course, party growth and the establishment and activity of cells have followed those developments. But too often there is a gap between the scope of the new problems posed by those changes and the reflection, initiatives, and innovations they require at the level of policy and organization. I would like to mention a few examples.

Giant new industrial enterprises have appeared in underindustrialized regions where there is little revolutionary tradition. Without underestimating the need those new men and women workers have to gain experience in struggle, have we always taken in hand, in all its scope, the problem of party organization--of the existence of class unionism and mass unionism in those big firms?

Other large firms where our party has long been firmly established among the worker categories have been transformed, with the specific weight of technicians and engineers having increased considerably.

Do we take that development sufficiently into account--a development which often corresponds to our current analysis of the makeup and role of the working class and the growing position of cadres linked to production?

General Effort for Permanent Recruitment

The appearance and growth of large working class housing developments, where in many cases the families of the most disadvantaged workers have been concentrated in a segregated manner, where real ghettos have been created, and where all the consequences of the crisis accumulate--all of that has been the subject of thorough reflection by the Communists. Let us recall the speech delivered by Georges Marchais in Venissieux. Our party often enjoys considerable influence and has many members in those places. At the same time, the difficulties due to the crisis and sizable migrations by the population are hindering regular and thorough activity in our cells. This calls for paying sustained attention to their political life, their links with our members, the specific concerns of the inhabitants, and the existence of activity by associations that can respond permanently to the sharp and pressing demands affecting daily life.

A mass party therefore involves a general effort at permanent recruitment through the reinforcement of existing cells and the establishment of new ones. It also involves an answer to two questions that are often asked, either implicitly or explicitly: what are our chances for recruitment? Is it not better to have fewer but better people?

At the last Central Committee meeting, Madeleine Vincent proved the existence of a Communist electorate totaling 5 million men and women who demonstrated a high level of political awareness in a situation that was complex, tough, and marked by fierce anticommunist campaigns. We can draw new and sizable forces for the party from among those voters--this is shown by every example of recruitment in recent times. Our possibilities for expanding the party's presence and influence are therefore very real.

Forcefully and rightly, the resolution of the 24th congress invokes the need to "improve very noticeably" the conditions for welcoming new members. This must not be ignored or allowed to remain an empty formula.

The fact is that we see the periodic resurgence here and there of reservations concerning this or that party member who does not attend meetings--who is not sufficiently active. Do the comrades who make such remarks think that they

are really making allowance for what is involved in belonging to the French Communist Party in the context of the political and ideological battle that is raging in our country? Are they making sufficient allowance for what our by-laws say concerning the efforts to be made at all levels to help all the party's members participate to the maximum in militant activity?

The only limit to the number of our members is our ability to bring into our ranks all those who are ready to come fight at our sides for our basic objectives in conformity with the rules of democratic life in the party.

A broad, offensive, and conquering spirit must become more characteristic of our permanent fight to strengthen the party, and all narrowness and unproductive sectarianism must be banished. That is an essential condition for the march toward the mass party that will be present and active in all areas: in a constantly increasing number of workshops, offices, firms, neighborhoods, communes, and villages.

2. Party More Strongly Anchored in Firms

The second major thought is a continuation of that concerning a mass party, and it calls for delving deeply into the idea of a party more strongly anchored in the firms so as to implement the strategy laid down at the 24th congress.

Concerning the "new political practice" and the "new-style mass activity" that requires implementation of that strategy, the 24th congress stressed the fact that this must be achieved first of all in the firms--primarily because "the firm now occupies a central place in the country's life," and also because, in view of the weakening of our work in the firms, it is there that we must "change the dimension and quality of our political activity."

The problem is of such importance that we have decided to make it the subject of an upcoming Central Committee meeting in September. At that meeting, we will be able to examine in depth the various facts in the situation and draw all the necessary conclusions concerning the changes necessary in our current practice.

Today, therefore, I will limit myself to drawing your attention to some major aspects of the situation: first, the reasons for having a party strongly anchored in the firms, and second, the requirements that arise as a result.

From the standpoint of reasons, first of all, it is indispensable to be well aware that in addition to those that have always existed, others have arisen just recently as a result of the new situation we are now experiencing.

Crucial Site for Setting People's Movement in Motion

It has always been necessary for the revolutionary party to be established in the firms, because that is the crucial site for the concentration and organization of the working class--the wage earners. That is where millions and millions of men and women meet, all day long and all year long, to produce something in common--to carry out together a job that has now been socialized

to the highest degree. And at the same time, because it is the crucial site for setting the people's masses in motion: it is there that the workers--and, increasingly now, other categories of wage earner--are uniting to defend themselves, organizing in class unions to see that their interests prevail, and fighting and developing the struggle with as much force as is needed to achieve satisfaction. It is there that the workers are able to really intervene to challenge capitalist criteria for managing the economy--to promote and develop other criteria consonant with their interest for the future and that of the country.

In the situation born of 10 May, that last fundamental aspect of things has now taken on a new dimension making it even more imperative for the party to be established in the firms. It can be summed up in the fact that the firms are the crucial site for carrying out the change that was approved by the majority of the French a year ago. Specific implementation of a new national policy, from the economic as well as the social point of view, depends basically on what actually happens within each firm in our country. This is especially true of the nationalized sector, both new and old, whose role as a leader in social progress, rationalization, innovation, and the reconquest of the domestic market may be marked by significant steps forward in proportion to the aware intervention of the mass of workers and the expansion of their democratic rights within the firms.

The attitude of fierce resistance shown by the employers to the new rights of workers, new management criteria, and an investment policy that challenges the capitalist mess and is aimed at new growth says a lot about what is currently at stake in connection with activity in the firms.

It is for all those reasons that it is now more indispensable than ever for the party to be strongly anchored in the firms.

The purpose, of course, is to get the workers moving toward precise and specific objectives, which may be very incomplete but which nevertheless lay the groundwork, each in its own way, for effective achievement of the overall policy.

The purpose, also, is to shed light on all the political problems in the factory that enable the workers to see each of their struggles from an overall perspective and to participate in other struggles of a more general nature in the fields of domestic and international policy.

Real Knowledge of Specific Situations

What this requires--and I want to stress the point--is that each party cell have real knowledge and mastery at all times of the specific situation in the firm or part of the firm where it wields influence. Moreover, it must be capable of exhibiting, on its own and at every moment, a very great capacity for initiative. This is so that it will be able, step by step, to obtain everything that can be obtained at the present moment. And so that it can present the communist viewpoint on all major current issues and stimulate discussion concerning that viewpoint. In other words, so that it will begin to advance immediately toward "French-style socialism."

As a general rule, the federation leaders have too superficial a view of the specific situation in each firm.

Restricting ourselves only to organization matters (which may reflect more general ideas), we can say that while most of our organization secretaries can give us the total number of members, they do not always know precisely where members and cells are in the firms, or in which workshops we are organized, or what our strength is in relation to the total number of workers, or in which workshops or departments we are very weak or nonexistent.

We think too often in general terms. Our activity is derived from above and is not centered often enough around and in the cells, and because of that, the dark spots and weaknesses show up much less clearly as long as our overall strength remains more or less the same.

In conclusion--from the standpoint of everything that must constitute the activity of party organizations in the firms today--the necessary leadership forces are required. For the moment, that problem is still far from being solved everywhere. Making an effort to solve it as soon as possible must therefore be one of our main concerns beginning with the work of this Central Committee meeting--a priority task for the collective leadership of each party organization at every level.

3. Intense Political Life in Party Organizations

The policy of the 24th congress does not and will not impose itself, no matter how correct it is. As we have said, it requires new political practice, a more significant political life, and renewed and growing reflection and initiative on the part of the party organizations, particularly the cells.

And that cannot be achieved unless the party has close, intense, and daily ties with the masses and unless there is insistence on the fact that such contact can exist only with the participation of all Communists who work and live among the masses.

It is equally obvious that this participation by all will be all the more real to the extent that party members assimilate and master our policy and our strategy to an ever-increasing degree.

We are well aware that the situation born of 10 May and the directives of the 24th congress require that each Communist continue his efforts at reflection and adaptation concerning what to say and do and how to say and do it. It is therefore a task of the first priority to create the conditions in which all Communists can discuss, understand, and implement our policy.

There is only one place where this problem can be fully solved: in the cell and nowhere else. The cell constitutes the party's fundamental link with its members. Only there do the real means exist for regular and lively participation by all Communists in the life of the party.

We need and we want Communists who will discuss, decide, understand, work things out, and participate. We must do better work toward that end. For each of our cells, this means:

First, holding regular meetings, which are indispensable for political debate and clarity and for making the resulting decisions.

Second, going to visit absent members to keep them informed and discuss with them the cell's analyses, decisions, and initiatives.

Third, making a real effort to train the rank and file by giving priority to the organization of section schools open to all, as was at the heart of the ideas produced by the Central Committee meeting on the training of militants.

Those points may seem like mere reminders. It must be realized, however, that priority for the cells, which is unquestionably necessary for the implementation of our strategy, is not yet the subject of all the attention and effort it deserves from our federation and section leaders.

But without active cells, there is no internal life, no democratic life, and no activity directed at the masses.

The bold and determined implementation of the strategy of the 24th congress presupposes, therefore, that the cell will be placed much more resolutely in the center of all our activity.

We have obvious faults in this area that must be corrected. For example, we tend to speak in generalities and to put forward ambitious objectives that pay almost no attention to the real life of the cells. Generalities lead to a situation in which the active cells do what is required by party policy, as they do in any case, while those which do not continue not to do so unless they are helped.

Addressing the problem of the political life of the cells, their openness to the outside, and their sensitiveness to the needs and aspirations of the people to whom they address themselves requires that the matter of their leadership be given constant attention. Having a secretary and officers capable of stimulating its activity is a fundamental political issue for a cell.

Solving the problem of the cell, its life, and its initiatives cannot be a spontaneous matter. It entails a permanent effort flowing from the Central Committee's leadership bodies through the federal committees to the sections--the regional committees being different organizations with a more limited role. No party leader, regardless of his level and regardless of his duties, can consider himself free of direct responsibilities with respect to the cells, and first of all his own.

Role of Sections

Concerning the role of the leadership, I would like to dwell particularly on the subject of section committees and section secretaries.

The section committee is the leadership body situated most closely to the cells and has direct contact with them. Being responsible for implementing party policy through the cells subordinate to it, it has the means of doing so through the militants belonging to it and in accordance with the proximity and limited number of cells in its territory.

The importance of the role of the sections in the life and activity of the cells leads us to the question of whether all the sections are well constituted and structured for playing that role in the best way.

In the case of sections with few members, it can be asked whether very many of them really have the resources for directing and helping the cells, establishing the party more solidly, and taking all the desirable initiatives. It can be asked whether, in many cases, they do not wind up operating like a large cell which leaves the weak cells to face their difficulties alone, which does not cover the entire field of activity in the cells it cannot help, and which thus blocks any prospect of development.

There was an entire period in which we undoubtedly had a policy of exaggerated decentralization. It is up to the federations to look into this problem, section by section, and to decide on the restructuring that may be necessary in terms of the basic concerns already mentioned, which are to have the leaders and forces capable of helping the cells and establishing the party more firmly.

For example, it must be considered whether dividing up average-sized communes into several sections would be in keeping with what we want or not. Large federations in the Paris region--which, it is true, have considerable resources at their disposal--have regularly rejected the idea of splitting up communes except in the case of certain large firms. Every city has its section headed by one of the federation's best cadres. They are comfortable with that situation, which makes it possible to fully see the unity of the communal reality.

The establishment of sections on a cantonal basis is also logical and has its advantages in many cases. But there may be disadvantages if the party's forces are too weak in a particular canton.

Our problem is not one of increasing the number of sections but of having sections that really administer party work in their territories, provide the cells with permanent assistance, and concern themselves constantly with the establishment of new party organizations.

Do we not also need to give thought to the small company sections which cannot always fulfill a section's obligations and whose activity inevitably suffers? By setting them up as sections, we have sometimes cut them off from the rest of the party without their having the strength to work and organize the life of the cells by themselves.

Are there not cases where we could gain by setting up a party committee and integrating those firms into the local sections?

Essential Leadership Tasks

In any case, that is well within the spirit of the bylaws, where article 19 says: "Local and rural cells, as well as all party organizations at all levels, give all possible assistance to party activity and to the establishment of new cells in the firms that are within their area of responsibility."

Of course, it is advisable to examine these questions of structure seriously. It is not at all a matter of upsetting everything. In our reflection, we must make an effort to step back a little and look at things differently: we must look at each case separately and see what should be changed and what should be kept, our concern being to have real sections everywhere. There is one point, however, on which we must be clear: company sections organized on a corporative basis have been set up here and there--that is, they comprise establishments belonging to the same corporate body but distinct and distant from one another. This seems negative to us and contrary to our concerns. Instead of drawing members and cells closer to their leaders, it separates them.

Everything we are saying about the importance of the section poses the problem of leaders and, particularly, section secretaries, who are key cadres. Their post requires the election of experienced leaders who have political skills and a sense of organization that have already been proven. But the tendency in some federations is to concentrate all the leaders best equipped with those skills in departmental positions to the detriment of the sections.

That is not the right solution. It is better for some of the best leaders in a federation to continue devoting themselves to heading up the sections so as to contribute as effectively as possible to the activity of the cells and of all Communists.

This remark applies to the committees in the very large cities, which must be especially careful to have solid sections and cells that function well.

The responsibilities of cell secretary and section secretary involve leadership tasks that are essential to the life of the entire party. That is where our thinking in regard to our policy on cadres in the federations must begin. Much more boldness is required to give the cells and sections the leaders they need--boldness to put new cadres in those positions, but also boldness to assign such tasks to cadres who have proven themselves and who are numerous in our federations.

You know, comrades, that the problems of organization are important and numerous and require sustained activity. The federation secretary for organization must therefore devote himself basically to that task, along with, of course, his participation in collective federation leadership.

The battle to strengthen the party, issue membership cards, and stimulate the life of the cells is permanent; it requires effort and initiative from one end of the year to the other. If the federation secretary for organization relaxes even slightly, the results are quickly seen in the sections and cells, and above

all, the consequences are felt in the collective concern about questions of organization.

If we want a mass party, a party more active in the firms, and greater political life in our cells, it is crucial that the federation official in charge of organization be completely available for that task.

4. Some Proposals and Immediate Objectives

Now I come to some of the work proposals and immediate objectives submitted to the Central Committee:

First, it will be necessary, of course, to begin by reporting rapidly on the work of this session of the Central Committee to all the federations and to do so in the most suitable forms so that all Communists will be in possession of all elements of our reflection concerning the party's organizational problems.

Second, we also intend to hold interfederation seminars for our organization secretaries in the very near future. This is an indispensable measure which must make it possible, first of all, for us to explain ourselves clearly so that the secretaries will be better equipped to carry out the directives we have decided on.

This measure is all the more necessary in that following the federation conferences held in preparation for the congress, a considerable number of new organization secretaries were appointed in a great many federations (38 percent of the organization secretaries are new).

Third, these immediate measures should be followed by seminars in each federation for the organization secretaries in the sections before the vacation period begins, in May and June.

Fourth, we must continue our general effort to strengthen the party--that is, to complete the distribution of membership cards and stimulate a many-sided recruitment drive.

The efforts of recent weeks have paid off and are indicative of our opportunities for rapidly placing all the membership cards. They are also indicative of the party's good health.

If there are to be many of us, and many who are more active, and if we are to have a political life in each cell with the mass of the Communists, this is the first requirement: every Communist with his card.

It is in the same spirit that we must also do a lot more for recruitment. What is shown by a sizable number of examples is that wherever we take the initiative and recruitment is organized as a consequence, we achieve good results.

Before Vacation Season: 20,000 New Members

We must direct our basic efforts in connection with our overall political activity toward the following areas:

- a) All the public meetings, assemblies, and debates that we sponsor now--and we should be sponsoring even more with the assistance of our cells--to explain the situation better, organize action, and provide our explanations based on the work of our 24th congress.
- b) The numerous, combative, and offensive struggles in which Communists and the party's elected representatives are present and active.
- c) The ANPE's [National Employment Agencies], where discussions with the unemployed are thorough and exciting--and where the latter join in great numbers to fight alongside the Communists against unemployment and for change.

In our section and federation festivals, which will be taking place throughout the summer months and which will be numerous, it would be a good idea to pay very special attention to recruitment in those great gatherings of the common people by making this issue a task of the first importance and sending in the necessary forces to handle it--that is, recruiters.

In a word, it is necessary above all to take advantage of all our opportunities to strengthen the party everywhere and at every moment.

There are no "big" or "small" initiatives. There are life and political activity, struggles, and debate with the masses to be taken advantage of to win new members.

And this leads us to a specific proposal.

We could set ourselves a goal of 20,000 new members between now and the vacation period.

Lastly, as I have stressed several times throughout this report, we must boldly envisage the party's constant expansion everywhere through the establishment of hundreds of new cells.

That is why, from the standpoint of a greater role for the life of our sections and greater activity in the direction of the firms, there is a need for each federation to decide carefully on a specific plan, clear responsibilities, and specific political initiatives aimed at the establishment of new cells, especially in the firms.

Dear comrades,

As was stated at our 24th congress, we want "to build a socialism with French colors," and for that purpose, in order to advance, we want to rally the vast majority of the people--we want to unite around the major objectives which are the distinctive features of the new society that we want: justice, freedom,

fraternity, and peace. We want a loyal and effective union of the left that will achieve the coherence which is indispensable for satisfying the country's hopes.

For the past year, France has been experiencing a situation more favorable to the advance toward French-style socialism.

We are deeply convinced that a great French Communist Party is a decisive means of achieving success: a great and open party, a people's party, and a democratic mass party that is deeply rooted in firms, housing developments, neighborhoods, and villages; a party that mingles closely with the working class and with all manual and intellectual workers; a party that experiences, through an ever increasing number of cells, an intense political life reflecting the needs of social progress and national development. We must work continually better at that task. How to do it is the purpose of today's meeting.

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CSO: 3100/672

MITTERRAND STYLE, POPULARITY, ACHIEVEMENTS ASSESSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 May 82 p 9

[Article by Jean-Marie Colombani: "A Man Who Knows How To Manage His Time"]

[Text] "To be in tune with oneself: that's the best health report I know of." If we use this formula (which he used in his most recent literary effort, "Ici et Maintenant" [Here and Now]), the president of the republic is in good shape. Indeed, how could he fail to be "in tune" with himself when--a year after his election--he is exercising the full measure of his powers and is placing these powers at the service of long-standing commitments?

As a member of the opposition Francois Mitterrand had combated the institutions of the Fifth Republic, but he soon had a presentiment of the profit that a united Left could derive from the mechanisms created under the system whereby the chief of state is elected by universal suffrage. The experience acquired during his first two candidacies for the presidency (December 1965 and May 1974) could not fail to be of valuable assistance to him in his new effort. His victory on 10 May 1981 marked the end of a long process of adaptation to the institutions of the Fifth Republic and, above all, to the complete spectrum of the duties of the chief of state.

Moreover, he had scarcely been installed in his presidential chair when he sensed that he would have to adapt himself to an office which had certainly not been conceived "for his benefit" rather than attempt to influence that office profoundly. Isn't he above all happy to hold that office--to be the embodiment of France, and to be identified with the state as if he had long occupied that supreme post?

"The institutions were not created for my benefit." That is precisely what he confided to LE MONDE on 2 July 1981, and he added: "But they are made for me to use." In his message to parliament on 8 July he affirmed the concept of presidential supremacy with equal succinctness--a supremacy to which he himself (in an interview granted to the BBC on 8 September) imparted a classic interpretation by emphasizing that he "deals with what might be called broad policy questions" while leaving to the prime minister the task of "dealing with the problems of everyday existence entirely as he sees fit."

The experience of 1 year in power might well cause him to emphasize the importance of the institution of the presidency. Do not the recent vicissitudes arising from the malfunctioning of the governmental machinery make corrective action necessary? This would involve intensifying the control exercised by the president and the presidential services over the work of the government. Originally, however, Candidate Mitterrand had hoped "to reequilibrate the central powers of government." This concern should have been translated into a grant--to the prime minister--of a greater latitude for action than in the past. The prime minister should be the coordinator of the "political" ministers, not just of the "technical" ministers. However, the determination that a disequilibrium exists--a determination that was officially made following the trip to Japan last month--opens the way to a heightened "presidentialization," if only because the chief of state's previous warnings to the government have become a dead letter.

Intuition and Experience

The intuition and experience of the president of the republic are therefore combining into a single evolutionary process. He has, moreover, elevated these two concepts to the status of political virtues; indeed, based on what he himself has said, intuition is "an exact science." When he speaks in these terms, Mitterrand is doubtless alluding to his own attributes; nonetheless, his intuitive faculties may prove to be an inexact science.

It would be unfair to put the entire blame on the head of government, for Mauroy has always complied with the presidential directives. As chief of state (and the same was true when he was first secretary of the PS), Mitterrand can on occasion be "undecipherable." His tactical skill, and his taste for what the Anglo-Saxons call "understatement," can lead to instances of "telescoping." Such a person, for example, while believing he is doing the right thing, will find himself criticized for having gone too far. If one adds to this his habit of entrusting the same dossier to two or three different persons while reserving to himself the task of synthesizing their efforts, it is understandable that a few sour notes will be produced.

There are other considerations which could lead the president of the republic to intensify his control over the action of the government, and to emphasize more strongly his presence on the domestic political scene. By virtue of the "ripple effect," the public may get the impression that it is not being governed or is being governed badly; moreover, a gentle and benevolent government may perhaps not correspond to present-day needs. The perception of insecurity--as much as insecurity itself--can be countered by a stronger governmental policy.

The concept that what is needed is an iron fist in a velvet glove--a kind of "quiet strength"--summarizes all the more accurately the state of mind of the chief of state in that the opposition quickly embarked on a course of "radicalization."

"Let us savor this moment, for we are going to have two very difficult years," Mitterrand told his confidants a few days after the socialist victory in the June 1981 legislative elections. "Our enemies will give us no quarter!" he

added. Indeed, the opposition has gone so far as to call into question the legitimacy of the president of the republic. In this connection, the remarks of Claude Labbe calling for Mitterrand's departure cannot fail to reinforce the president in the belief that the Right will definitely not accept the principle of the alternation of power. It is not particular about the campaign tactics it uses: it is clear, in the view of the chief of state, that the rumors concerning the state of his health are being spread by men who wish to destabilize the Left. In this connection he makes use of a concern for sincerity. Whenever he has felt pain he has never concealed the fact, notably during his trip to Lorraine in October 1981. He has made a commitment to publish a health report every 6 months. As he awaits the next report (due in June), he is showing himself to be alternately annoyed and ironic. He was annoyed, for example, during his trip to Japan when he spoke of the successive "cancers" that had been imputed to him; in Denmark he chose irony instead, when he emphasized that following his victory he had hardly dared to "doze off." In all cases, he dismisses the subject contemptuously.

A campaign of this sort cannot help but motivate him to stand firm. "Have you looked at me closely?" he recently asked those who were questioning him in private on this subject, as if to emphasize more strongly that it is not his nature to yield. The opposition will--like it or not--have to wait for the next legislative elections, and most important of all, the next presidential election.

This refusal to bend before the slightest onslaught explains why people are still anticipating a press conference and a reorganization of the government. Both these actions would put into concrete form the presidential desire to set matters to rights; to make haste in doing so, however, would give the appearance of acting under the pressure of events. People will therefore wait.

Reform and Unification

"I have 7 years ahead of me," he has often said, notably at his first press conference last 24 September. Mitterrand has proved--by his past history--that he knows how to manage his time. He is accordingly using the length of his term in office as a basic weapon in the arsenal at his command--a term which should, in effect, witness the fulfillment of the contract signed on 10 May 1981. That contract sets forth the conditions under which the program of political change will take place--change consisting of a series of structural reforms which should neither fall short of, nor go beyond, what Candidate Mitterrand had promised. His commitments "constitute the charter for governmental action," he stated in his message to parliament.

Viewed from this standpoint, the chief of state can draw up a positive balance sheet. If an inventory is taken of the 110 proposals contained in the Creteil manifesto (adopted in January 1981), the conclusion can to some extent be drawn that the most important reforms have either become law (nationalizations, decentralization, justice), or have been initiated (audiovisual program, workers' rights), or will probably be initiated (tax laws, social security).

The fact that there have been breaches of the contract (reduction of the length of military service, land tax, the right to vote for immigrants in municipal elections) does not alter the overall positive character of the balance sheet.

This inventory is not sufficient, however. It may, in fact, not even be the most important consideration. At the end of Mitterrand's term in office, will the nation reproach him for having kept his promises? The danger is more likely to lie in the possibility that the process of change will become bogged down.

It also happens that there has been a difficult apprenticeship. The time needed for the apprenticeship is easy to grant to a government representing forces that for 20 years have been in exile. It is also easy to understand that a time lag may occur between the reforms and their perception--between the passage of legislation and its translation into reality. The lack of preparation, however, is more prejudicial, as is also the attitude of a government that seems to retreat when categorical demands accumulate. In the fact of the rise of corporatism, it becomes urgently necessary to arbitrate--to "hierarchize the properties," in the words of the PS.

At this stage it is well to recall the watchword of the Mitterrand campaign. "I appeal," he said, "to the unified people in behalf of national reform." One must therefore point out that as of 10 May 1982 the reform remains to be put in place and the unification has not yet been achieved. The fact is that the one is not viable without the other.

President of the Republic Mitterrand declared himself at the outset to be a "socialist president," as a majority of his fellow citizens had wished him to be. The "people of the Left," however, are not all the French people--and therein lies a contradiction that is difficult to overcome. Mitterrand wants to retain the confidence of the electorate, but he is also interested in having it understood--every time he speaks--that in order to surmount the crisis everybody must mobilize. This invitation (which is repeated untiringly) stems from a desire to unify without lapsing into unanimism--to achieve unification, from which no one except certain privileged persons would be excluded.

The surveys showed, however, what the defeat of the Left in the cantonal elections subsequently confirmed, namely that public opinion has quietly reverted to an accentuated bipolarization which is the expression of a balance-of-power relationship between the Right and the Left. This conclusion is reinforced by the burden of an uninspired society: the Mitterrand experience is the first ever to take place on the Left without mobilization. It remains therefore for the chief of state to elicit support no longer in his own name but in the name of his plan--on condition, however, that he make it clear that it is not so much a question of building a "French-style socialism" as of "reforming" the nation.

It is not that the chief of state lacks an awareness of what is at stake. Anyone who meets him is impressed by the fact that this man is now and henceforth convinced of the necessity for perpetuating France's historic vocation and halting Europe's decline: his many trips abroad cannot be explained on any other basis.

Mitterrand has shown himself to be obstinate in his quest for power, and he will have to be obstinate in the exercise of that power. He appears quite determined not to depart from that serenity which he used to envy in the Chinese leadership and which is undoubtedly the best way to remain true to oneself.

Popularity and Unpopularity of Three Presidents

Commissioned by FRANCE-SOIR, the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] regularly submits--to representative samples of the voting-age population--identical questions as to the feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction aroused by the president of the republic and his prime minister. This survey has been conducted for a sufficient number of years to enable a comparison to be made of the evolution of public opinion with regard to Georges Pompidou, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand in the first year of their respective 7-year terms (the "curves" for their respective prime ministers--Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Jacques Chirac and Pierre Mauroy--will be published in our forthcoming issues).

We have not taken into account the popularity curve of General de Gaulle, because the IFOP surveys taken in 1959--the first year of his 7-year term--did not have the monthly regularity that they have had subsequently.

Whereas Georges Pompidou and Francois Mitterrand recorded--on the day after their election--a "satisfaction" rating of 54 percent, Giscard d'Estaing's rating was 10 points lower but remained above that threshold during the first 12 months of his 7-year term. By way of contrast, Pompidou and Mitterrand witnessed the number of French citizens who are "satisfied" with their performance decline steadily during more than half of the first year of their respective terms.

In the case of all three, the "trough" of the satisfaction curve is attained around November and December. Despite a decline in March for Mitterrand, the current chief of state does have a "satisfaction" index equal to the one he recorded the day after he took office. This stability 12 months later, however, is compensated by the substantial rise in the "dissatisfaction" index, which was a constant rise except for a decline in January. Whereas in less than 1 year Georges Pompidou had provoked an increase of only 1 point in the percentage of "dissatisfied" persons, Giscard d'Estaing saw this percentage in his case increase by 10 points. The increase for Mitterrand is 18 points.

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CSC: 3100/622

MAUROY ON CENTRAL AMERICA, ARMS REDUCTION, OTHER POLICIES

Paris HUMANITE-DIMANCHE in French 7 May 82 pp 2-3

[Interview with French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy by Francois Hilsum, editor in chief of HUMANITE-DIMANCHE, and Jack Dion; date and place not specified]

[Text] Question: Mister Prime Minister, here we are a year after the defeat of the right and the beginning of a policy symbolized by one word: change. Among the reforms implemented during these 12 months, what do you consider most important?

[Answer] By entrusting the responsibility of government to the left, the French have themselves emphasized the three priorities of our program: employment and thus economic recovery; solidarity and thus social justice; the new citizenship and thus a society of dignity and negotiation.

The economic situation, as left to us by the right and as imposed on us by the development of the world economy, obliges us to meet three challenges. Restoring growth and thus controlling the major stabilizing factors: prices, currency and foreign trade, without which there is no lasting economic success. Keeping up with the new technological revolution and thus implementing a comprehensive policy for industry, energy and research. Building a new international economic order and thus preserving peace.

Everything which has been done during the past year by the government of the left is in keeping with these three priorities and is aimed at meeting these three challenges.

Only the three priorities which we have established will enable us to meet the challenges facing us. In today's world, economic development is inseparable from the requirement of solidarity. Our economic policy and our social policy are thus closely linked. For example: the reduction of working hours. This is one of the oldest demands of workers. Wasn't the tradition of 1 May established for the 8-hour day?

We are making new advances in this regard. But at the same time, this policy contributes to the fight against unemployment and the reorganization of businesses, thus making gains in productivity possible. Social and economic goals are thus complementary.

The change initiated, however, can be carried out only in stages.

The first stage constituted what I called "the basis of change": decentralization, nationalizations, the guarantee and extension of individual liberties. The government of the left has chosen to begin with major basic reforms to provide solid bases for change.

The second stage, which has just been completed, was that of social regulation. The procedure followed has demonstrated the common determination of parliament and the government to step up the rate of making decisions in order to establish the new legal framework of the solidarity necessary for the battle of employment. Today we can work to make change effective, to make it a part of concrete reality, to make it a part of the daily lives of French men and women.

This change in daily life, this deepening of change, constitutes the third stage, which we are now beginning. The main legal texts have been submitted to parliament, during the present session. I am referring in particular to workers' rights.

Question: Despite everything undertaken by the leftist majority, major problems still remain--I am referring in particular to purchasing power, unemployment and workers' rights. Will structural reforms, such as nationalizations, make it possible to advance quickly in these three areas?

[Answer] Since the left came to power on 21 May of last year, an immense amount of work has been accomplished.

The French--regardless of their impatience--are well aware that it was impossible to move faster than the law, than democracy. They also know that it was neither desirable nor possible to move more slowly, since it was necessary to sow without delay the seeds of change whose effects, as we all know, in view of the situation in which we found the country, would neither be immediate nor rapid.

You mentioned purchasing power, unemployment and workers' rights. But you know that the government has already taken broad action on these three points.

You know the state of lethargy of the French economy 1 year ago. Thanks to a moderate resumption of household consumption and public spending, we have gradually revived it.

Inflation was 14 percent 1 year ago. Unemployment was rising at a rate of more than 20 percent annually. Today, the rate of inflation has slowed, but it is true that we have a long road ahead.

Don't forget that we inherited an inflation which was more than twice that recorded in Germany, our principal trading partner. But our policy is beginning to bear fruit.

The purchasing power of wage earners, the lowest wage earners in particular, has been increased since the beginning of the government's 7-year term as a result of a substantial increase in the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] and social security benefits.

Gradually eliminating inflation in France is not simple and is a long process, especially since we want to maintain purchasing power. But we are determined ... and persistent.

In the case of the fight against unemployment, the results are even clearer. Whereas unemployment has risen by 20 to 30 percent in the case of our principal trade partners--I am referring to the FRG and the United States--during the last 6 months, we have greatly slowed this increase. It is now only 6 to 7 percent and we think we can stabilize the situation by the end of the year. Then we will have to gradually reduce the figure of 2 million unemployed persons, inherited from the previous administration.

At the same time, you know that the government has drawn up four bills on the new rights of workers for this spring session of parliament. Increased liberties in business will mark the beginning of a decisive stage in the new citizenship desired by the French on 10 May; democracy will not stop at the doors of factories. But of course, you are right, expansion of the public sector will make it possible to go further and to make such businesses a real area of social experimentation. And I am convinced that in the light of what can be accomplished in the nationalized sector, social partners will be able to negotiate new advances.

Question: You justified the 11-billion-francs financial aid granted to business by the need for a "relaunching of investment." But the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] immediately retorted that there would be no resumption of investment before the end of the year and that in any case, for 1983 its scope would remain "limited." What do you think of that reaction from employers?

[Answer] When one of the twin engines of a plane malfunctions, the aircraft is forced to reduce its speed and risks becoming destabilized. In the spring of 1982, the French economy is in a somewhat comparable situation: the engine of consumption was put back into operation in the fall as a result, in particular, of the measures taken by the government to increase low wages and social security benefits, but the engine of investment has not yet been started again. Thus it was essential and urgent to establish the conditions for a resumption of investment.

This is why the government will very soon, following the completion of negotiations underway with nationalized industrial groups, decide on a program for the resumption of public sector investments. But it will also be necessary to get private businesses to take action, which still account for more than 50 percent of all productive investments.

To do so, the government will ask parliament to reduce and reform a tax, the trade tax, which has always been criticized by leftist parties because of its negative effects on employment and investment. The government has also decided to freeze, until 1 July 1983, the amount of contributions of businesses to the general Social Security System. In return, I have asked business representatives to actively contribute to the policy of economic recovery and creating jobs by signing solidarity agreements, hiring young people for vocational training, continuing or resuming negotiations on reducing working hours and resuming their investment programs.

A meeting has been scheduled with trade organizations in late 1982 to assess the efforts made by businesses in these various areas.

The government has assumed its responsibilities. Now it is up to business leaders to assume theirs. When the time comes, we will judge the results on the basis of actual evidence.

Question: You have explained several times that change could not be the work of government alone. Isn't action by the people necessary to respond to the maneuvers of the right and all reactionary forces?

[Answer] You have undoubtedly noticed that it took us nearly a year to obtain the votes for major structural reforms. This is the normal result of the interaction of parliamentary institutions; we are not complaining. But a lesson should be learned from this: the opposition is unwilling to accept its defeat in the spring of 1981. Using every stratagem, including parliamentary procedures, for example, it has not hesitated to delay implementation of the change desired by the majority of French people. We should draw a significant conclusion from this: Change is the affair of government, but it is also the affair of trade unions and all leftist forces. To succeed, change needs a political will, but also the mobilization, and I would say the unity, of all those desiring it.

We must build an interdependent country in which workers will mobilize for economic and social progress.

Yes, the peaceful mobilization of workers, consumers and citizens in general is one of the guarantees of change.

Why and in what form?

Because in the collective life of this country, the basic change which we want to achieve is that of a social life based on dialogue and negotiation.

We do not hide it: Whoever says negotiation also means firmness and a relationship of peaceful forces.

It is the responsibility of workers, citizens and consumers to obtain the means of peaceful force in this ongoing negotiation, which we want to make the hallmark of our policy and the means for social progress.

It is their responsibility to assemble in trade unions, parties and associations, which are the tools of collective expression and social negotiation. This means--in businesses, in particular, but also in many sectors of economic and social life--that organized citizens and workers must demonstrate their vigilance and their responsibility.

Vigilance, because it is and will be their responsibility to secure the full exercise of all new guarantees and rights to be granted to the French people at their places of work in the future.

Responsibility, for it is a matter--with a difficult international economic situation and very keen foreign competition--of imbuing the French economy with

a new dynamism by improving productivity everywhere that this is possible. Thus vigilance, responsibility, and I will add unity, that unity of popular forces which, of course, is always a compromise but which adds enthusiasm to force!

Question: You are the head of the first government of leftist unity, which is an historic event in itself. For you, what is the significance of communist participation in the French Government?

[Answer] All political forces constituting the presidential majority and the parliamentary majority are working together in the government to implement the program of change submitted by the president of the republic and approved by the French people.

It is satisfying to me that all leftist forces, which personify the hope of the people in history and in events, are together in the government, for you are well aware that this has long been our desire and the goal of our fight, at the side of Francois Mitterrand.

With regard to communists and socialists, you can understand that I am experiencing this period in our long history--which I hope will also be a long period in history--with a very special feeling, a period in which we are working together, each of us loyal to his own convictions and aware of our differences, to implement the president's program of change, which the French people approved on two occasions in May and June of last year.

Question: The second session of the UN Conference on Disarmament will be held in New York on 7 June. In your opinion, what role can France play in helping to stop the nuclear arms buildup, reducing weapons and promoting peace?

[Answer] Your question raises one of the most serious problems of our time. The stockpile of weapons which has been achieved is a monstrous thing in itself. It gives man the power to wipe out civilization, considering the capabilities of nuclear weapons. It makes it possible to maintain destructive conflicts in the four corners of the earth, conflicts which unfortunately affect Third World peoples especially. This situation cannot be tolerated. The response of France must be based on an analysis of the underlying causes of the evil.

The joint analysis which we made, at the time of the joint program, stated that if a general, simultaneous and controlled disarmament, to take up the old formula of Jean Jaures, could not be obtained in the immediate future, a balance of forces should be established. As supporters of the gradual disappearance of blocs, we were no more willing, by joint agreement, for France to belong to the Atlantic Alliance.

The strategic competition of the superpowers, which has resulted in enormous nuclear arsenals, must be brought under control. To achieve this, neither side should develop its weaponry at such a rate that the nature of the global balance would be necessarily affected. For there is no better guarantee for maintaining peace, as history teaches us, than the existence of a balance of forces, which inhibits the aggressor's temptations. In the case of nuclear arms, this balance is that of deterrence. Such efforts have recently been made in the East, in particular in the case of weapons threatening only Western Europe and not the

United States, thus the structure of European security would be profoundly cracked if a clear determination to preserve the balance, for the future, were not affirmed by the West.

But such a balance does not mean increased stockpiling of weapons. The effects of the imbalance of conventional weapons in Europe could be reduced through talks started as a continuation of the final Helsinki Accord. The superpowers could simultaneously and coordinatedly, in Geneva, reduce their intermediate arms and, once START has begun, their strategic weapons. Thus the arms level could be reduced considerably, without our security being affected. This is what France wants.

In the Third World, the problem is posed in different terms. It is no longer a question of defusing from within the confrontation between the East and West; it is a matter of enabling sovereign states to guarantee all their international security responsibilities. They must be prevented from becoming the hostages of East-West conflicts or from being forced to belong to a bloc. To achieve this, the countries of the South must be given the means to overcome the structural crises threatening them and social justice must be permitted to progress in their countries as well. France will endorse all formulas capable of strengthening the security of regions of the South and of slowing the effort to arm those countries: denuclearized zones, regional arms limitation agreements, the establishment of peacekeeping forces, impartial verification of agreements.

This is the philosophy which will motivate our country's participation in the next special UN session on disarmament. Nothing will be ignored. The need to prevent the arms race in space, the importance of disarmament verification measures will also be stressed. Our approach must be realistic and comprehensive.

Question: Two regions of the world are now in a particularly disturbing situation: Central America and the Near East. What specific steps could our country take?

[Answer] The position of the French Government has been expressed clearly on many occasions. In the case of Central America, it is based on the following analysis: The tensions which are rife in that part of the world--in Guatemala, El Salvador and elsewhere--are the result of a blocked political system and a socioeconomic situation characterized by intolerable inequalities and inequities.

The conflicts currently shaking Central America are not and must not become the expression of an East-West contest. In our opinion, their solutions necessarily require a process of internal reform, but they also depend on a new order or on a new type of relationship between North and South.

French initiatives should be assessed in the light of this analysis. On one hand, the Franco-Mexican declaration on El Salvador, which affirmed the need to include all parties in order to achieve a political solution. On the other hand, there was the aid granted to the young Sandinist Revolution so that it could simultaneously rebuild Nicaragua and retain its originality. Finally, there was the economic aid granted to Honduras and our endorsement of the peace proposals made by President Lopez Portillo of Mexico and the governments of Panama and Honduras.

In the Near East, France has no initiative to take on behalf of the region's governments and organizations. On the other hand, it does have a role to play and will do so every time that it is needed to advance the quest for a solution to world peace by one step, however small it may be.

I will give you two examples. In the spirit of UN Resolution 242, we decided to support and to guarantee the return of the Sinai to Egypt by participating in the force of observers deployed along the border between the two countries. Similarly, we are participating in the UN force in southern Lebanon.

More basically, France, because it respects above all and does not yield to opportunistic temptations, is in a position to be heard by both sides.

As for our basic position, it is based on four principles:

1. We affirm the right of all peoples to self-determination, possibly leading to the right to a sovereign state.
2. We affirm the right of all states of the region, the state of Israel as well as the future Palestinian state, to live in peace within definite and recognized borders.
3. We sanction no unilateral violation of international decisions.
4. We state that all steps taken must be the result of negotiations between the region's forces, negotiations to which the superpowers, Europe and France may lend their guarantee if requested.

Question: One year after 10 May 1981, we must also talk about the future. What will be the highlights of government action in the coming months?

[Answer] Employment, solidarity, new citizenship: The government remains committed to these priorities. Whence the draft laws which parliament is in the process of examining. Rather than bury social partners under an avalanche of regulations, priority has been given to the negotiating process. It must be the rule and not the [last] resort.

From this first choice derives a second one: Putting the partners in a position to hold responsible negotiations. Which implies that the recognition of worker's rights at their place of work and broadening the role of wage earners' representative organizations corresponds to the reaffirmation of the employer's leading role in business.

It is particularly through negotiation that one of the principal reforms of future months must be achieved: that of Social Security. This is one of the finest labor achievements. Wage earners' representatives, on boards of directors, must be given back the majority and the powers of which they have been deprived since 1967. Wage earners must again be able to supervise the administration of funds--which make up a budget greater than that of the government--with the sense of responsibility and restraint which characterizes the worker movement.

With these new rights and these new powers, workers and citizens, if they exercise them with determination, will become the real agents of change in their daily lives, in their cities and in their businesses.

More generally, the first months were devoted to creating the conditions for change. The coming months will be used to make this change part of daily life. This means that even more than yesterday, the government will have to be in step with trade union organizations and all movements contributing to the improvement of life and to social progress.

Change was proposed by Francois Mitterrand; it was written into laws, ordinances and regulations; it must now be lived.

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CSO: 3100/669

POLL SHOWS CONSERVATIVE PARTY AGAIN GAINING FAVOR

Oslo DAGBLADET in Norwegian 15 May 82 p 3

[Text] The Conservatives gained 2.2 percent and the Labor Party 1 percent in the MMI [Marketing and Media Institute] barometer for April.

The Progressive Party declined 1.8 percent. For the other parties, there were only slight variations compared to the March survey. The field work was carried out in the period from 20 to 27 April.

The trend in the MMI barometer is that the Labor Party now lies at a level roughly 3 percentage points above what it achieved in the election last fall. This climb has been weak but steady ever since September, as the curve shows. The climb is a reasonable consequence of the party's position in the opposition. The Conservatives, on the other hand, have gone the other way. The March figure was 29 percent, while the April figure is just under the election result of 31.8 percent. Variations from one month to the next can be due to statistical weaknesses.


But it is also reasonable to assume that the Conservatives are already being affected by the erosion to which ruling parties are exposed, especially when they are in a minority position.

The party's problems are underlined by the background figures in the MMI survey. The Conservatives now have the support of around 85 percent of those who voted for the Conservative Party in the election last fall. The corresponding figure for the Labor Party is 94 percent.

Crossover Votes

The Conservatives have come into a voter crossover relationship with the Progressives. The reason the Conservatives gained a little in April is that fewer of the party's voters from the Storting election now say they would vote for the Progressive Party than was the case in March. At the same time, more of the Progressive Party voters from last fall replied that they would now vote for the Conservatives than was the case in March. Thus the crossover of voters between the two conservative parties is to the advantage of the Conservatives this time, while last time it benefitted the Progressives.

TENDENS



Party Trends
Marketing and Media Institute, Inc.

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. 1981 election | 5. Center Party |
| 2. Labor Party | 6. Socialist Left Party |
| 3. Conservative Party | 7. Liberal Party |
| 4. Christian People's Party | 8. Progressive Party |

Upside Down

The relationship between the Conservatives and the Labor Party has been turned upside down in relation to the situation before the election. While the voter crossover favored the Conservatives during most of the period following the 1979 election, it is now the Conservatives who must relinquish to the Labor Party quite large numbers of the Conservative voters from the last election.

The Labor Party is also capturing much more of the group that did not vote in the September election than is the case for the Conservatives. This means

that those who are becoming eligible to vote now have a greater tendency to go to the Labor Party rather than to the Conservatives, a factor that is the opposite of the situation prior to the Storting election in September.

Unstable

All the other parties are in an unstable period too and losing voters to other parties. The Christian People's Party has lost most to the Conservatives but also some to the Liberals. The Center Party lost almost 10 percent of its voters from the fall to the Conservatives. As usual, the Liberal Party is caught in its middle dilemma, losing voters to both Conservative and Labor parties.

Viewed this way, the background figures show that the Liberal Party is the only "middle" party of the three who like to call themselves by that name. SV [Socialist Left] is also losing voters to both right and left and is thus in about the same position as the Liberal Party in that respect.

Congress

The opinion poll was taken in part after the Conservatives held their national congress in Stavanger and after the transport workers' strike began. The first factor may explain the Conservative gain to some extent.

But we cannot be sure until future surveys are taken whether this is a chance fluctuation or an expression of a political tendency based on the attitude of the government and the Conservative Party toward the tariff settlement and the strikes.

MMI Party Barometer

<u>Party</u>	<u>Date Conducted</u>		
	<u>1981 Election</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>	<u>Apr 82</u>
Labor Party	37.1	39.3	40.3
Socialist Left	5.0	4.9	4.6
Red Election Alliance	0.7	0.9	0.9
Norwegian Communist Party	0.3	0.3	0.3
Conservative Party	31.8	29.0	31.2
Christian People's Party	9.3	8.9	8.2
Center Party	6.6	6.0	6.1
Liberal People's Party	0.6	0.4	0.3
Liberal Party	3.9	3.9	3.6
Progressive Party	4.5	6.3	4.5
Others	0.2	0.1	0.0

6578

CS0: 3108/111

POLL EXAMINES SUPPORT FOR CABINET MINISTERS: STRAY POPULAR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 82 p 5

[Text] How good or how bad has their performance been? The Norwegian Opinion Institute asked the people to sit in judgment on four of the governments cabinet ministers: Foreign Minister Sverre Stray, Finance Minister Rolf Presthus, Commerce Minister Arne Skauge and Justice Minister Mona Rokke. They were also asked to assess the five most prominent parliamentary leaders. The one who did best among the cabinet ministers was Mona Rokke, with Sverre Stray coming in a good second. Among the parliamentary leaders, Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian People's Party was given the highest marks, with Conservative Jo Benkow coming in a close second.

At the request of AFTENPOSTEN, the Norwegian Opinion Institute asked people in April if they thought the selected politicians had done a very good job, a fairly good one, a fairly poor one or a very poor one. On the basis of the responses, the following rank list can be set up:

Table I. Popular Assessment of Leading Politicians

<u>Name</u>				<u>Rating</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Very</u> <u>Good</u>	<u>Fairly</u> <u>Good</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fairly</u> <u>Poor</u>	<u>Very</u> <u>Poor</u>	
Mona Rokke	12	49	61	18	6	24
Sverre Stray	5	50	55	21	8	29
Rolf Presthus	9	44	53	25	7	32
Arne Skauge	7	45	52	19	7	26
Kjell Magne Bondevik	14	51	65	21	6	27
Jo Benkow	19	44	63	20	7	27
Johan J. Jakobsen	9	51	60	21	5	26
Gro Harlem Brundtland	17	41	58	26	10	36
Hanna Kvanmo	9	36	45	29	16	45

When we look at the figures for "very good" and "fairly good" combined, Mona Rokke heads the list of cabinet ministers and Kjell Magne Bondevik

tops the list of parliamentary leaders. On the basis of who had done the "least poorly," the ranking would be somewhat different than it is in this table.

If we go by the opinion poll, people are well-satisfied with the efforts of the politicians. With the exception of Hanna Kvanmo of the Socialist Left Party, a majority rated all of them very or fairly good. It may appear striking that it is the women in the group who got both the best rating, as in the case of Mona Rokke, and the worst, as in the case of Hanna Kvanmo and Gro Harlem Brundtland. But there is no indication in the figures that the sex of politicians played any role in the assessments of them. But it was a general characteristic of the respondents that the men tended to be harsher in their judgments of the candidates than women were. The same was true of the youngest and the oldest, i.e. the group under 30 and the group over 60 years of age, as well as of those with the lowest incomes.

Thus people thought Mona Rokke had done the best job. The justice minister has appeared prominently in several cases in which people were interested, involving such things as police violence and combatting narcotics, and apparently she has done so in a way that inspired respect even among political opponents. It is worth noting that she is the only cabinet minister in the group to receive positive marks among a majority of Labor and SV [Socialist Left] sympathizers. Her performance was rated as good by 44 percent of Labor sympathizers and 55 percent of SV sympathizers, while 36 and 42 percent respectively gave her a poor rating.

The appointment of Sverre Stray as foreign minister was met with a good many reservations and skepticism and critics jumped on him for his handling of such things as the Turkey issue and nuclear policy. But most people seem to think he has done a good job. Even in the Labor group, he was rated fairly good by 38 percent compared to fairly poor by 37 and very poor by 10 percent. Not surprisingly, SV people were least enthusiastic about his performance. Very poor according to 40 percent, fairly poor according to 35 percent, but even so he was rated fairly good by 22 percent of them.

The finance minister's seat is not a good springboard for winning a popularity contest. But it is certainly possible to gain recognition for doing the job well and a majority of the respondents in this poll gave Rolf Presthus this kind of recognition. Less than a third felt he had done a poor job in spite of all the commotion surrounding the Conservative tax promises. Even in SV and the Labor Party, 27-28 percent thought he had done a good job.

There has been a lot of controversy surrounding Arne Skauge in connection with both the Reksten and the Alexander Kielland affairs, but he seems to have stood the test well in the opinion of the man on the street. He scored low on the minus side and the reason why he did not get a higher plus rating may have been that apparently many people found it hard to evaluate his performance. The "don't know" percentage in his case--22--is much higher than it is for all the other politicians in the poll, with none of the others getting above 15 percent in this category.

Kjell Magne Bondevik got good marks from those far in the ranks of the opposition. Although his best ratings came from his own party (very good, 47, and fairly good, 47), along with the Center Party with the Conservatives coming in third, a majority of Labor and SV people also thought he had done a good job. Incidentally, the parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party had one thing in common with his Labor counterpart--both were rated highest by older voters.

The Conservative parliamentary leader, on the other hand, seems to have made a better impression on younger age groups. Almost as many SP [Center Party] people (89 percent) as Conservatives (90 percent) credited Jo Benkow with doing a good job, while KRF [Christian People's Party] supporters have more reservations with 66 percent. In the Labor Party and SV the percentages are down to 36 and 45 percent. Among Conservatives the very/fairly good distribution was 39/51 percent.

Johan J. Jakobsen, like Kjell Magne Bondevik, distinguished himself by having made a good impression on a majority of SV supporters, while the Labor attitude was 50-50. But no other party is as well satisfied with its parliamentary leader as the Center Party--very good, 37 percent, fairly good, 63 percent.

In the Labor Party, 40 percent gave their parliamentary leader a rating of very good, with 47 percent rating her fairly good. A majority of SV supporters also feel Gro Harlem Brundtland has acquitted herself well--66 percent in all. It may come as more of a surprise to learn that SP voters are not far behind with 61 percent, while a corresponding number of Conservative voters think she has done a poor job. A small majority of KRF voters turned thumbs down.

Hanna Kvanmo received an equal number of good and bad marks. What pulled her down is that she topped the list of poor ratings from all the nonsocialist voters. It doesn't help much that those in her own party who are very or fairly satisfied with her produced ratings of 43 and 54 percent respectively. In the Labor Party too, there is a surplus on the plus side (51 percent in all). It may be a small consolation that 75 percent of Liberal sympathizers are satisfied with her. But the same is also true of their feelings about Jo Benkow and Johan J. Jakobsen.

6578

CSO: 3108/112

SECURITY ISSUES RAISED TO FIGHT LABOR PARTY MAY BACKFIRE

Oslo DAGBLADET in Norwegian 26 May 82 p 2

[Commentary by Jahn Otto Johansen]

[Text] Will the Conservatives try to put pressure on the Labor Party in the area of security policy and run the risk of weakening a unity that crosses party lines? Is the temptation to expose the Labor Party as unreliable and vacillating on security policy becoming so great that it will push aside more important national considerations? There is reason to ask these questions following two security policy moves by the Conservative government--one already well-known and widely discussed, the other being prepared by the leadership of the Defense Ministry.

It is hard to explain Storting bill 120 "on part 33 of NATO's jointly-financed infrastructure program" in any other way, unless it was inspired by sheer political incompetence. It involved 49 million kroner, Norway's share of the 1.5 billion for NATO's nuclear modernization. It is remarkable in itself that these formerly top secret figures are now being made public in Norway and that this procedure has been selected.

For that matter, the Defense Ministry did not have to ask Storting for any concrete appropriation, because the infrastructure program has become a purely routine matter. This was evidently the procedure they are leading up to in other NATO countries such as Denmark, Belgium and The Netherlands where nuclear modernization (referred to in technical circles as TNF--Theater Nuclear Forces) is a very delicate and controversial issue.

Now these countries may be forced to take up the entire TNF debate a year earlier than it would have come up otherwise. And it will and must come up. NATO's dual resolution from December 1979, in which Norway played a dubious role to insure passage, is based on the assumption that negotiations have been tried and that the deployment of these early missiles is under serious consideration as a result. In the meantime, all the practical work is to be done--that is what Norway's contribution of 49 million is intended for.

The political thinking behind this is that this will put pressure on the Soviet leaders so they realize this is something serious and that they cannot achieve anything without making concessions themselves. That is

where things stand in Geneva. Skeptics claim, however--with good reason, in my opinion--that such an enormous weapons program acquires a dynamic force of its own and will be hard to stop once it gets rolling. Thus it could easily turn out that the negotiations part of the dual resolution is nothing but a farce.

This puts the Labor Party leadership in a real bind. The Conservative government is in reality simply pursuing a decision for which the former government was responsible. Therefore, it is difficult for the Labor Party to come out in massive opposition to Storting bill 120. That would leave the party open to charges of lack of credibility and vacillation on security policy. On the other hand, the opposition in the party and the general anti-nuclear sentiment in Norway will put great pressure on party leaders at an earlier date than they were expecting it. What could be a short-term tactical gain for the Conservatives might in the long run create great problems for a security policy unity that crosses party lines.

But it does not appear that the Conservative Party is content with that move. The political leadership of the Defense Ministry now wants to ask the Americans to revise the agreement on stockpiling materiel so that it also includes A-6 Intruder planes. These were removed after something that might be called a hotly-contested vote by the Labor Party's Storting group. Defense Minister Stoltenberg and others felt the A-6 Intruders would be so advanced and offensive that it could arouse Soviet suspicions that the stockpiling had a much more far-reaching purpose. The stockpiling agreement was so restricted in the end that one could say with reason that it did not have any direct connection with American nuclear strategy and that it took legitimate Soviet security interests into account. The Americans did not like this limitation, but went along with it: "We can live with that!"

By taking up the stockpiling agreement for review at this early date, the government is provoking the Russians and stimulating the campaign that was based on the very charge that the stockpiling was part of the American nuclear strategy. In a larger national perspective, this is both unnecessary and extremely unwise. Has the temptation to delineate the Conservative government as more resolute and more credible on security policy than the Labor Party gained the upper hand, as we mentioned? We will see a sharp polarization of the security policy climate in this country if that is the case. Will the middle parties, for example the Christian People's Party, follow the Conservatives on this course?

6578

CSO: 3108/111

LEADERSHIP OF SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY DIVIDES ON FALKLAND ISSUE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 May 82 p 3

[Text] The national committee of the Socialist Left Party does not even condemn Argentina's occupation of the Falkland Islands.

That is the substance of an entry into the minutes of the executive committee of the Socialist Left Party. It was written by Finn Gustavsen and approved by such well-known SV [Socialist Left] people as Bjorgulv Froyen and Kari Loftesnes.

The background for the debate in SV is the situation in the South Atlantic. At an executive committee meeting at the end of April, Finn Gustavsen provided orientation on the political situation. The debate concentrated on the Falkland Islands and a proposal was made that SV support the boycott of Argentina.

International Law

The SV working committee had approved in advance a statement that made it clear that sovereignty over the Falkland Islands must be decided on the basis of international law. Berge Furre, who had written the statement, also stated that Norway should not take part in a unilateral boycott.

ARBEIDERBLADET has learned that there were strong reactions to this on the SV executive committee. Storting representative Arent Henriksen did not want a stand taken on the proposal. He wanted the working committee and the Storting group to decide the matter.

The executive committee of the Socialist Left Party refused to go along with that.

Finn Gustavsen then insisted on adding an entry in the minutes. This procedure is very unusual in the Socialist Left Party. Gustavsen's addition to the minutes said: "The statement from the SV working committee is unsatisfactory, especially since it does not even condemn the aggressor's--Argentina's--occupation of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. It practically equates the fascist Argentine regime with 'British colonialism.'"

In the addition to the minutes, Finn Gustavsen and his colleagues ask what colonialism is involved in connection with the Falkland Islands:

"In this case as in all others, the desires of the population should be the only deciding factor. If the 1800 people of British origin had been Indians, SV would have been in no doubt about its position. We ask the SV Storting group to support an economic boycott of a fascist Argentina during the debate on the bill in Odelsting."

The last sentence also "notes with satisfaction that the group in the same context will take up a motion on a boycott of the fascist South Africa."

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CSO: 3108/111

BRIEFS

OSLO LABOR AGAINST MISSILES--The Oslo Labor Party committee asked the party's Storting group to oppose funding the construction of facilities for nuclear missiles. In a letter to the Storting group, the local Labor branch said that talks on limiting the weapons are scarcely under way before plans are being made to prepare deployment sites. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 82 p 3] 6578

BRUNDTLAND: PARTY BACKED MISSILES--"The Labor Party is committed to a resolution to produce and prepare for the deployment of the new nuclear medium-range missiles for NATO. It is also committed to working for an active line of negotiation in the hope of arriving at a solution that will not require the deployment of any nuclear weapons." The party's chairman and parliamentary leader, Gro Harlem Brundtland, said this on the radio's political segment Saturday. The important words in this connection are "prepare for." Here she is on a collision course with sizable sections of the party who cannot accept Norwegian participation in the construction of missile sites while the talks on reducing the nuclear arsenal in Europe are going on. Today the political leadership of the Labor Party must discuss what stand the party will take on the appropriation of 49 million kroner for NATO's jointly-financed construction program for 1983-88. The sum is Norway's share of the costs of the missile facilities. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 82 p 3] 6578

CSO: 3108/112

PAPER VIEWS SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SPLIT OVER JAS VOTE

PM150815 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Jun 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Voting 172-167 in Favor of JAS"]

[Excerpts] So, everything went as the presumably Social Democratic Trade Union branch chairman at Saab in Linkoping had hoped in a television news program: The nonsocialists triumphed in the marathon Riksdag debate on the JAS question. And there was more. The decision was taken not just by a one-vote majority. Two Social Democrats from Ostergotland widened the margin to 172-167 by giving their support to the JAS.

This means that the Social Democratic Party now appears split into three on defense policy--the official party line, Maj Brit Theorin and her defense nihilists, at present eight in number, and the group which already supports the JAS today. The two Social Democratic Riksdag deputies from Linkoping are not alone; people with similar views are to be found in many places and at lower levels in the party hierarchy, especially around the places where the JAS has a palpable effect on employment. It therefore comes as no surprise that the party leadership sought to prevent the split from becoming apparent so near election day through its call for a postponement of the JAS decision.

Given the strong party discipline which is such a feature of the Social Democratic Party it is of course remarkable when two Riksdag deputies rebel on an issue which has so occupied party leader Olof Palme. For what is left of his accusations that the government pushed through the JAS with the help of a voting coup? If this is true, some of those taking part in the coup were Social Democrats.

Employment has played an important role for the two rebels. Lars Henriksson also considers the JAS a good aircraft and makes no secret of the fact that as a layman he is forced to attach great importance to experts' opinions. Together with Maria Lagergren he represents a viewpoint which is supported by a strong body of trade union opinion. The two are by no means isolated black sheep. They are bound to have more people behind them than the Riksdag voting figures show.

The 1981 Social Democratic Party Congress resolution on defense and security policy stated:

"A guiding light for the Social Democrats should be to reduce overall spending on defense in the coming 5-year period."

The Riksdag has now reached its decision. The defense forces need peace in which to work in the preparatory period leading up to the reorganization and the rearrangement of priorities in its wartime structure. It would be reasonable to expect the Social Democrats to accept the decision that has now been made.

But how will things be with the JAS?

A real contribution to broad agreement on defense policy would be for the Social Democrats to now accept the JAS in principle. However, during the long time that the project will run it is possible that all politicians will be prepared to promote opportunities to create an improved product.

CSO: 3109/187

POLL SHOWS VPK NOW UNDER FOUR PERCENT THRESHOLD

Environment Party Big Gainer

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 82 p 6

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] In an IMU (Institute for Market Research) survey of party sympathies in April and May, the new Environment Party received a surprising 7 percent of the voter support, a 3 percent increase over the March figure. This means that the Environment Party now is larger than both the Liberal Party and VPK (Left Party Communists). At the same time, the previously large gap between the socialist and the nonsocialist parties is beginning to close in that support for both the Social Democrats and VPK is declining.

The great increase in support for the Environment Party is the only statistically significant change in the survey taken among 932 persons during the periods 19 to 28 April and 3 to 12 May. During this time the political debate was dominated by the economic cutbacks, primarily qualifying days for sick benefits. The large May Day demonstrations of the labor movement also took place during this period.

The results are as follows: Conservative Party 23.5 percent (+1.0), Liberal Party 6.5 percent (-1.0), Center Party 12 percent (+0.5), Social Democrats 45.5 percent (-1.5), and VPK 3 percent (-1.0).

This means that the nonsocial block now has 42.0 percent, compared to 41.5 last March. The socialist parties have 48.5 percent, compared to 51.0 in March. Thus, the gap has closed from 9.5 to 6.5 percent since March. In February the difference was 11.5 percent.

The number of those interviewed who could not or would not indicate the "best party" was down to 3.5 percent, compared to 4.5 percent in the two previous surveys.

The Environment Party, which was officially established last fall, has been around the 4 percent mark since it first was treated independently by IMU. The party receives its greatest support from the 18 to 29 year age group and

among the highly educated. Previous surveys revealed that the Environment Party wins most of its supporters from the Center Party and the Liberal Party, as well as from first-time voters. It should be noted, however, that IMU surveys measure actual party sympathies and are not election predictions.

The Social Democrats, who have been high in the IMU polls since the 1979 elections, began to lose ground during the first half of this year. The 1.5 percent decline to 45.5 percent is within the margin of error, but it is possible to speak of a downward trend since this is the second poll in a row in which support for the party has declined. In the 1979 elections the Social Democrats received 43.2 percent of the vote.

The Liberal Party is having difficulty converting its government status into increased support among voters. Following increases in the two previous polls--most recently by 2.5 percent--they have now dropped 1 percent to 6.5 percent, making them smaller than the Environment Party.

The Christian Democratic Party, which has gained the support of several celebrities in recent months, remains at 1.5 percent.

1982 Polls

	No. 16 1 Feb.- 24 Feb.	No. 17 15 Mar.- 7 Apr.	No. 18 19 Apr.- 12 May.
Number of qualified voters interviewed indicating a party preference (= basis for determining %)	895	881	900
% indicating as "best party":			
Conservative Party	23.5	22.5	23.5
Liberal Party	5.0	7.5	6.5
Center Party	12.5	11.5	12.0
Christian Democratic Party	1.5	1.5	1.5
Social Democratic Party	48.0	47.0	45.5
Left Party Communists	4.5	4.0	3.0
Environment Party	4.0	4.0	7.0
Other parties	1.0	2.0	1.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0
% of qualified voters who could not or would not indicate "best party"	4.5	4.5	3.5

So far 18 polls of party sympathies have been conducted. With the exception of the increased support for the Environment Party which is statistically significant, the changes between the most recent and the second most recent polls are within the margin of error. Thus, the 1.5 percent decrease for the Social Democrats also is within the margin of error, but the trend for the party during the first half of 1982 is downward.

The studies were conducted using a nationwide probability sample of Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 74. The interviews were conducted during visits at the homes of those interviewed. The following question was asked: "Which party do you think is best?" An election situation was simulated: the party preference was indicated using "ballots" and "ballot envelopes."

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Environmentalists Still to Decide on Program

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 82 p 6

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] Voters will not know if the Environment Party supports a nonsocialist or a Social Democratic government before the elections. The question of how the party would vote in parliament remains unanswered.

The Environment Party refuses to align itself with either political block, but if the party wins representation in parliament it will be placed immediately in the position of having to choose sides on the government issue.

"We recognize the problem," the party's convener Rolph Mono told DAGENS NYHETER, "and several ideas have come up, but nothing has been decided. We may hold a referendum among our members. Perhaps we can find some nontraditional solution."

From 2 to 4 July the party's executive council will meet in Falun. At that time, a campaign platform will be approved with several additional planks on economic policy, agriculture, transportation, and perhaps taxes. In addition, they will discuss the vote for prime minister and choose a new convener, i.e. party leader, for the election campaign.

The so-called convener is elected from the 11-person collective leadership that is called the political committee. It includes the well-known former Liberal Party member Per Gahrton. Previous conveners were Eva Sahlin of Hudiksvall, Inger Paulsson of Ostersund, and now Mono from Vallentuna near Stockholm.

"It would be wrong to enter the election campaign with statements linking us to one block or the other. Before the elections we should gather information from other parties in several different areas. Later we will take a position one issue at a time," Mono said.

No to JAS

This spring has seen several examples of support across party lines by the Environment Party. On the question of sick benefits the party supports the Social Democrats. The Environment Party agrees with the Conservative Party on the matter of salaries for members of parliament, while it opposes the JAS military aircraft, along with VPK and KDS (Christian Democratic Party). On the childcare issue they agree with the nonsocialists that parents themselves should choose the type of childcare they prefer.

The party has not yet taken a position on taxes and tax exemptions, but it supports reduced payroll taxes. The party will send a questionnaire to its members to determine which political issues they view as most important.

Poll Shakes Orebro

Some figures have been released that have shaken politicians in Orebro Province. The Conservative Party newspaper LANSNYTT conducted an opinion poll in the province to determine voter sympathies before the election.

The Social Democrats and the Conservative Party are the largest parties, followed surprisingly by the Environment Party which, according to this poll conducted by Hans Erlandh Marketing, received 8.2 percent in the province. It is followed by the Center Party with 6.9 percent, the Liberal Party with 4.6 percent, VPK with 3.3 percent, and the Christian Democratic Party with 3.0 percent.

Siv Kitzler of the Environment Party was happy with the results and stated that the Environment Party was not a one-issue party. The established parties, on the other hand, were surprised by the figures.

SDP Down for Second Month in Row

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 82 p 6

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The race is far from over and the campaign will have a greater effect on the outcome of the elections than ever before. This was indicated by a DAGENS NYHETER-IMU voter poll for May, which showed an increase to 7 percent for the Environment Party, while VPK fell below the cutoff for representation in parliament, receiving only 3 percent of the vote.

Opinion polls do not predict election results and should be taken with a grain of salt. The present poll, however, shows that the outcome of the next election is far from certain. Much could happen during the 4 months that remain.

The best bet must be at least a slight victory for the socialist block. It should be noted, however, that the Social Democrats have dropped in the poll

for the second consecutive month and VPK for the third consecutive month to the critical 3-percent mark.

This trend means that the difference between the political blocks has dropped from 9.5 to 6.5 percent and if the Environment Party's votes are added to the nonsocialist side, which is uncertain, the voters are evenly divided.

These trends give the established political parties something to think about during the final phases of the campaign. If the Environment Party should receive 4 percent of the vote and gain representation in parliament, Olof Palme would have a much more difficult time than expected scraping together a socialist majority in parliament.

"Protesting"

The opinion poll for May follows the normal trend to some extent. According to all surveys since the late 1960's the curves for the two political blocks separate after elections and converge again before elections.

The difference this time is that the curves began to converge later than normal and that the minor parties represent a completely new and uncertain factor on the political scene before the elections.

One reason could be that many voters have not yet decided how they will vote in the election and are "protesting" in response to the opinion polls.

The present voter poll emphasizes primarily the great instability and uncertainty of many voters.

This uncertainty, in turn, surely is related to the increased political confusion, primarily among nonsocialist voters.

The nonsocialist takeover in 1976 after 44 years of political exile clearly was met by exaggerated expectations and hopes.

Once in power, the government found that many election promises could not be kept. The new government was not the radical change of course that had inspired many nonsocialist voters during the campaign.

The broken campaign promises helped erode the credibility of the established parties, increase the contempt felt toward politicians, and improve the prospects for the formation of new parties such as the Environment Party. Whether this is temporary or lasting remains to be seen.

Battle for 30 Percent

Voter polls from previous elections indicate that about 70 percent of the voters made their decision long before the elections. These voters are affected neither by election campaigns nor maneuvers of various types during the campaign.

Thus, the election campaign normally concentrates on 30 percent of the electorate. Of these voters, about 15 percent choose a party during the summer and 15 percent during the final week of the campaign.

Two main categories of voters make their decision during the final week. They are supporters of the parties presently in government and first-time voters.

In the 1979 election almost 40 percent of the Liberal Party's voters decided to support that party during the final week of the campaign. Almost 30 percent of the first-time voters made their decision during the final phase of the campaign.

Today's voter poll is a clear indication that many voters are finding it even more difficult than before to make their party choice.

The number of voters who make their decision during the summer or late in the campaign probably will increase. This will make the campaign more intense and increase the amount of political maneuvering.

Thus, this campaign will have a greater impact on the outcome than in previous elections.

Perhaps four out of ten voter will make their decision after the summer vacation period. If these voters should make radically different party selections than the stable voters who made their choice long ago, there would be considerable shifts in voter opinion during the final phase of the campaign. Supporters of the Environment Party, for example, are largely first-time voters.

The established political parties now must compete seriously with the Environment Party for voters, especially the two parties now included in the government. About half the Environment Party's voters came from these parties. If these voters can be convinced to return to the fold on election day, the government parties would increase their support considerably over the present IMU figures.

The other issue involved in the final phase of the campaign is the battle for votes between the nonsocialist parties and the Social Democrats.

Here the trend is clear:

The nonsocialist parties promise continued cutbacks to reduce the deficit in the national budget, while the Social Democrats promise continued tax increases, primarily to increase employment.

That is like a choice between cholera and the plague.

There is also a paradox in this year's campaign:

Both political blocks are campaigning on issues that have little support among the voters.

The qualifying days for sick benefits clearly are a burden to the nonsocialist parties, while the Social Democrats have their collective employee funds.

The campaign seems to be primarily a question of who can be frightened best--or perhaps most--with social cutbacks on the one hand or socialization of private Swedish industry on the other.

The following is most probable:

A nonsocialist voter who is against qualifying days for sick benefits hardly will go over to the Social Democrats and accept employee funds in the bargain.

A Social Democratic voter who is hesitant on the employee fund issue hardly will go over to a nonsocialist party and accept qualifying days in the bargain.

Credibility

Thus, in the final analysis, the election will be decided in favor of the party grouping that wins the greatest credibility among the voters. As uncertainty increases among the voters, the approach of the mass media during the final phase of the campaign increases in significance. In this case the politicians are victims of circumstance.

In the 1979 election the nonsocialist parties convinced the voters during the fall that the nonsocialists had overcome the economic crisis.


This achievement hardly can be brought about in this year's campaign. The voters have a more sophisticated approach to campaign promises and little credibility remains.


It is possible, on the other hand, that the Social Democrats already have a stronger grip than before on young voters who have suffered from unemployment under the nonsocialist governments.

Since these voters also are the most mobile, they may be an important factor in the outcome of the election.

Long-Range Trends

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 82 p 6





Paper Warns of Strong Environment Party

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 82 p 2

[Article by Svante Nycander]

[Text] The Environment Party's 7 percent in today's IMU survey shows that there are movements and undercurrents among the voters with which both the mass media and the politicians are out of contact. In a brief time and in relative silence the Environment Party has managed to gather more supporters than two of the five old established parties. The party has not yet been taken seriously in the general debate. SIFO intentionally designed its voter poll to minimize the support of the Environment Party on the assumption that the party would not be a contender in the election. The only people showing any interest in the Environment Party seem to be several hundred thousand voters.

Which voters are attracted to the party? According to the IMU survey, young and highly educated people seem to be strongly represented. The farther north in Sweden one goes, the more supporters one finds for the Environment Party.

Politically speaking, there are two groups that do not have much in common--environmentalists and opponents of nuclear power on the one hand and generally dissatisfied and disappointed voters on the other, most of whom come from a nonsocialist background. Holding such a coalition together probably will require a greater measure of political competence than the Environment Party has shown to date. Over a period of several years, the chances for success of such a movement are extremely small, but that will not prevent the snowball from continuing to roll long enough for the Environment Party to achieve representation in parliament this fall.

According to the latest IMU figures, the Environment Party would hold the balance in parliament. This is the first IMU survey since the fall of 1979 that, in terms of votes, would not result in a socialist majority in parliament. Both the Social Democrats and VPK lost some support this spring--a total of 4 percent since the February poll. The Social Democrats now have 45.5 percent of the voter support, while VPK has only 3 percent.

Why this sharp decline? In part, the Social Democrats are a victim of the internal split among the nonsocialist parties. During their entire time as an opposition party, the Social Democrats have been high in the polls when the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Conservative Party governed together, only to drop when the government was in the hands of the middle parties alone.

But the difficulties of the Social Democrats also are self-inflicted. The party and the labor movement are committed to the collective ownership of production capital to an extent never before tried in a democratic country. The Social Democrats never have won an election in which questions of socialization have been central issues and the scepticism of the voters toward the employee funds is well documented.

How would parliament function with the Environment Party in a key position? Perhaps the probability of such an election outcome is not great, but the possibility exists. How would the established politicians approach a new parliamentary party led by Per Gahrton?

A parliamentary nightmare, most would say. Worse than the "lottery" parliament from 1973 to 1976. At least in principle the lottery showed good judgment every other time.

Possible attempts to attract the Environment Party into a middle block (with Gahrton as energy minister, perhaps) must be seen as hopeless. A protest movement cannot immediately become a party that supports the existing government. The hopes of the Social Democrats for support from the Environment Party are just as small.

The historical contribution of the new party could be to demonstrate the necessity of cooperation between political blocks. New possibilities would arise. Parties that managed to agree on a major tax reform would discover that they shared many other common points. The Social Democrats, many with a sigh of relief, could drop the employee funds with their prestige and unity still more or less intact.

Ignoring the Environment Party has not made it go away and perhaps now the battle between it and the established parties will come into the open. The party's platform, which so far no one has noticed, will be scrutinized closely. What type of government would the party be prepared to support? Answers will be demanded. It is possible that the Environment Party is a delicate plant that grows only in a well protected place and cannot survive harsh winds. This will be determined now that the party seriously threatens the old parties.

9336

CSO: 3109/172

POLL SHOWS PALME AS FAVORITE FOR PRIME MINISTER POST

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 May 82 p 6

[Article by Bo Ostlund]

[Text] Olof Palme is the best prime minister candidate among the party leaders. This opinion was found among the Swedish people by a SIFO (Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls) survey in which the voters chose the "best candidate" in a system with two party leaders competing against each other.

Olof Palme won all his "matches."

Similarly, Ulf Adelsohn was second, defeating both Falldin and Ullsten in his "matches."

Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin was last.

SIFO conducted a similar survey before the 1979 elections. Then, too, Olof Palme was victorious, while then Conservative Party leader Gosta Bohman was last.

Best Prime Minister

SIFO asked the following question: "If you compare Thorbjorn Falldin and Olof Palme, who do you believe would be best as prime minister?" This and similar questions with the various names were put to 1,039 persons between 24 and 30 March and between 14 and 20 April.

The opinions of the Swedish people concerning their prime minister candidates are presented below.

1982 Results:

Palme-Falldin	63-22
Palme-Ullsten	62-20
Palme Adelsohn	55-30
Falldin-Ullsten	28-44
Falldin-Adelsohn	27-48
Ullsten-Adelsohn	34-41

1979 Results:

Palme-Falldin	54-35
Palme-Ullsten	42-37
Palme-Bohman	57-31
Falldin-Ullsten	20-61
Falldin-Bohman	48-33
Ullsten-Bohman	63-22

The results are a compilation of all responses.

Falldin Loses Big

Divided into nonsocialist and socialist voters, the figures are different. With regard to Palme and Falldin, for example, Palme received 34 percent of the nonsocialist vote in the choice between him and Falldin, while Falldin received 46 percent of the votes. Among socialist voters, Falldin received only 2 percent, while Palme received 92 percent of the votes.

Compared to 1979, Falldin has suffered great losses among nonsocialist voters--from 64 percent to 46 percent.

Ola Ullsten has also lost support since 1979. In 1979 Ullsten was prime minister and at that time he received better figures than in the present poll. At that time, Ullsten lost by 42 to 37 against Palme. This year he lost by 62 to 20.

Forward for Adelson

Ulf Adelson registered the greatest gains. In 1979 Gosta Bohman was defeated by both Falldin and Ullsten. This time Adelson beat both Falldin and Ullsten.

9336

CSO: 3109/170

PAPER EMPHASIZES STRONG STANDING OF ADELSON IN POLL

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 May 82 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] SIFO (Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls) let the leaders of the four large parties compete for public opinion to see who is the most popular prime minister candidate. All the candidates met in head-to-head "matches."

It should be noted that Olof Palme won his matches not only because his party is the largest, but also because he received more support among nonsocialist voters than the nonsocialist party leaders received among socialist voters. There is a minority of nonsocialist sympathizers who, in the choice among Adelson, Falldin, and Ullsten, prefer Palme as prime minister, in some cases perhaps because they would like to have a coalition government.

Compared to a similar study in 1979, Palme has strengthened his position against both Falldin and Ullsten, while Adelson has maintained Gosta Bohman's position with respect to Palme. Even more interesting is the fact that Gosta Bohman lost convincingly in 1979 to both Falldin and Ullsten, while now Adelson is just as clearly the winner against the middle-party leaders.

This may be seen as a reflection of how the task of governing has eroded the credibility of the middle parties, but it also reflects the strong position of Adelson in present public opinion.

Of course, the significance of such polls should not be exaggerated, but the fact that both party leader Olof Palme and LO (Federation of Trade Unions) contract secretary Harry Fjallstrom harshly criticized Ulf Adelson in their speeches on Sunday indicates that they see him as their most dangerous opponent in the election campaign.

9336

CSO: 3109/170

VPK SECRETARY BO HAMMAR DISCUSSES ELECTION GOALS FOR PARTY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 10 May 82 p 6

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander]

[Text] There must be a change in government. The new parliament must have enough VPK (Left Party Communists) representatives to introduce radical policies and to keep the Social Democratic government from seeking compromises on the right.

These are the two primary goals set by Bo Hammar for the present election campaign. Several months ago he was given the difficult job of acting party secretary during the election campaign, since VPK's regular party secretary Forsberg became ill.

Bo Hammar, 41 years old, first a journalist and now international secretary of the party for several years, is more a quiet analyst than agitator at the barricades, turns each question over several times in his mind, and differentiates between good and evil. Even when he speaks on the employee fund issue he allows himself no stronger expression of emotion than a sad smile.

"The Social Democrats have a phenomenal ability to mobilize their opponents and confuse their supporters."

Power and ownership--they could have mobilized the entire labor movement with these issues.

Taxes are another issue on which Hammar hopes to make the Social Democrats "come to their senses."

He speaks with reluctant admiration on how the Social Democrats have emerged so unscathed from the debate over a tax proposal that "is diametrically opposed to any semblance of justice."

"The Social Democrats are fighting tooth and nail to reduce taxes for the rich by tens of thousand of kronor. This is totally grotesque!"

The criticism of "ordinary people" has been drowned out by the sharp criticism

of the Conservative Party concerning other points of the tax reform.

"In essence, however, it is a purely rightist policy that is reflected in the tax reform: it takes from the poor and gives to the rich, according to the classical pattern."

Bo Hammar wants the election campaign to deal with "simple questions of justice and equality": jobs, sales tax on food, taxes, rent, construction, and security for the sick and the aged.

These, according to Hammar, are issues that are not only of current interest, but are in line with the fundamental ideology of VPK: New industrial jobs not only reduce unemployment, but also help restore security and intrinsic value to productive work.

But is not VPK today a party of public employees and university graduates? Hammar said such a picture was extremely one-sided. It is a matter of equality for the party to be involved in public service.

"But we are not ashamed that we have many highly educated communists today. If there had been more progressively thinking people within the bureaucracy and fewer conservatives, we would have a better society today."

And what about Poland? This is an important issue that has confused many socialists, according to Hammar. He regrets the "sad tradition among leftist fractions" that views everything in terms of black and white--the Soviet Union, China, and Albania are either totally perfect or totally reprehensible. There is now a certain political maturity within VPK that is lacking among the political sects, according to Hammar. "We have clarified and developed our position."

Hammar says he has no difficulty understanding those who "prefer a society with tax on food and outrageously high rent, but with democratic rights" to a society without such rights.

"All peculiarities occurring in nations with socialistic goals are blamed on socialism, while no one blames the 10-percent unemployment in Western Europe or the military coup in Turkey on the market economy.

Some people will be fooled by the other parties' efforts to link VPK and the events in Poland, but most people recognize the integrity of the Swedish communist party, according to Hammar.

"As you know, we do not have too many generals in the VPK leadership."

Many believed, and the opinion polls indicated, that the nuclear power referendum would strengthen the VPK position.

"Unfortunately, we were unable to retain the support of all those who became politically active for the first time. This certainly is because many people

felt they had been tricked and came to despise politics when the parties that supported nuclear power divided into two alternatives for tactical reasons."

"We hope to mobilize radical pponents of nuclear power again. The Environment Party should not be underestimated, but basically it is a nonsocialist party."

9336

CSO: 3109/170

DEFENSE WILL AMONG YOUTH INCREASING: MORE VOLUNTEER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 14 May 82 pp 1, 11

[Article by Anders Jerichow and Øjvind Kyre]

[Text] Young people are queuing up in front of the gates of barracks. At the beginning of last year, only 37.9 percent of all new servicemen were volunteers. Today, 86 percent of the new soldiers drafted for the Armed Forces on 1 April come on their own initiative.

"This quite clearly means a limitation of the compulsory military service," Palle Simonsen, chairman of the Defense Policy Committee of the Folketing, says.

"To me, the only interpretation of these figures is that the attitude among young people has changed. The vast majority of them are today in favor of the Armed Forces."

Jan Øberg, peace and conflict researcher: "It can only be due to the general situation prevailing in the society that more young people are volunteering for the Armed Forces. If the alternative to young men is alcoholism and unemployment, it will be natural for them to choose a reasonably sensible job in which they may get an education, a good salary and a driver's license, which they may get in the Armed Forces."

Military Travel Office

Parallel to this development, the number of conscientious objectors has dropped to the lowest figure in a decade. Today the number of young conscientious objectors is 502. Early next year, the figure will drop to 311 men.

"We are no longer in the days of the flower children when young people dissociated themselves from the Armed Forces," says Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jessen, the Defense Command at Vedbæk, commenting on the new figures. "Undoubtedly, it is a question of a change of attitude. Many of the young people are also of the opinion that good papers from the Armed Forces will help them in the labor market later on."

H. F. Jessen is in charge of the Compulsory Military Service Section. "Last year, we had 20,000 calls from young people who wanted to find out how to plan their time

in the compulsory military service. Many call us even if they have the possibility of drawing a number exempting them from military service," he states.

The possibility of drawing a number exempting one from military service is, indeed, greater today than ever before. Of the 36,000 numbers found in the lottery drums of the draft boards last spring, 16,049 had prizes in the form of 9 months in the Armed Forces, 8 months in the Civil Defense or 11 months in the Conscientious Objectors Service. "On 11 March, only 2,000 numbers of the 36,000 numbers meant compulsory military service," says H. F. Jessen, lieutenant-colonel.

Among those who draw low numbers, some will invariably fall away. Some of them have volunteered beforehand, others choose the Civil Defense or the Conscientious Objectors Service, "and they will then be replaced by volunteers," he states. "We, deliberately, seek out such gaps, so that we may help those in the queue.

Last March, we needed only draft between 200 and 300 men for the compulsory military service, and that is rather unique. That meant that we reached a total number of volunteers of 86 percent.

We operate like a travel office, entering the names of the young men into computers. Via the computer, we may then pull the names of those on the waiting list as space becomes available. At the moment, everything has been sold out, but when we get a vacant ticket, we will take a name from the waiting list," the lieutenant-colonel adds.

The Life Guard and the Navy are the most popular services. They are filled entirely with volunteers, and the Life Guard has been booked till the second half of 1983. But also Bornholm is becoming popular. The Armed Forces now report on 50 percent volunteers among the new soldiers on the rocky island. That has never happened before.

Jessen also states that the Armed Forces account for a larger percentage of volunteers than the Civil Defense, where only 50 percent are volunteers.

"Not Dangerous Soldiers"

"This is an unfortunate development," says Pelle Voigt of the Socialist People's Party, who has himself done his military service as a conscientious objector. "In our opinion, it may have negative side effects filling the military with volunteers to the extent that it leads to an undermining of the concept of compulsory military service, and we get closer to a professional army."

"We feel safer having an army of people drafted for the compulsory military service than having an army of people who have chosen the military as a profession," Pelle Voigt says.

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen of the Radical Liberal Party, which by tradition is critical of the Armed Forces, on the other hand, is of the opinion that "it is a positive development. It is a good thing that we need to apply force only as far as a few people are concerned. I am not afraid that the voluntary basis will create any

problems or that the military will develop into something like a state within the state."

The defense policy spokesman of the Radical Liberal Party, who was himself a soldier for 16 months, is, moreover, gratified that "we shall thus get the lowest number of conscientious objectors that we have ever had." He says that "the unemployment situation has many negative effects, and that many young people choose the military rather than being unemployed."

"If they make this choice merely as an emergency solution, it is, of course, sad. But young men do not, for that reason, become dangerous professional soldiers," he says.

Defense Will and Unemployment

"In the course of 1980 and 1981, there has been a noticeable increase in the defense will both among those serving their compulsory military service in the Armed Forces and among those serving in the Navy," says Commander Bent Rieneck, who has his masters degree in psychology and is the chief psychologist of the Military Psychological Service of the Defense Leadership Center. Here, psychologists have previously measured the attitude of the population to the concept of defense. Now they try to find out the defense will.

The change in favor of the defense is pronounced, also among the population outside the ranks of conscripts," says Bent Rieneck. He stresses that the Armed Forces registered this change before unemployment set in.

Jan Øberg, Ph.D., peace and conflict researcher, who is also a member of the government's Security Policy Committee, does not have much confidence in this: "It is, in principle, difficult to measure at all a concept such as the defense will. For example, the population has previously been asked if it wanted to pay more to the Armed Forces, and that poll clearly showed that there was no will to do that."

"In West Germany, a representative section of the population was recently asked if they were willing to defend the country, if necessary with nuclear weapons, and only 15 percent were in favor of that. I, therefore, believe that it is possible to undertake an opinion poll which will give the opposite result of the defense will found by the Military Psychological Service."

Jan Øberg finds that the poll, at best, is an expression of a political polarization. He points to the members of Conservative Youth who do not believe in peace without rearmament and the increasingly more active peace movements which agitate in favor of a full stop to the nuclear weapons race, as the obvious poles.

Gloomy Situation to Conscientious Objectors

However active the peace movements may be, the situation to conscientious objectors has never been as gloomy as it is just now. In the mid-seventies, it was not the Armed Forces but the Conscientious Objectors Service which experienced queues of young people. Well over 1,850 conscientious objectors were called up at a time, while 1,000 conscientious objectors were queuing up for the "substitution service," which is the official name for the conscientious objectors' service. It must not be too attractive, it is said in the Civil Defense Service Board.

In the mid-seventies, conscientious objectors and soldiers still received the same pay. "Today, it costs a young man 50,000 kroner to become a conscientious objector rather than joining the Armed Forces," says Carl Skoubæk, spokesman for the supervisors of the East Jutland Sjellebro Camp for conscientious objectors.

"Those who join the Armed Forces get nearly 8,000 kroner a month, conscientious objectors merely 3,700 kroner. The eyes of any schoolboy will brighten up at the idea of being paid 8,000 kroner a month for becoming a soldier when leaving school," he adds.

Bent Strobel, a consultant for conscientious objectors of the Civil Defense Service Board, says that the differential treatment given soldiers and conscientious objectors has become unreasonably great.

"Unlike soldiers, conscientious objectors have no possibilities of getting an education during their service. Conscientious objectors also get a lower pay, they have to serve 2 months longer, and they have less chance of getting supplementary aid from the welfare authorities during their service. In times of unemployment, it is not so strange that so many young people will volunteer for the Armed Forces, with the result that the number of conscientious objectors drops. The few who opt for the conscientious objectors service have to pay a very high price for it.

Who can then talk about the defense will? After all, the peace movements have never had as many supporters as now."

Camp Closed

The Civil Defense Service Board has just submitted to the Ministry of the Interior that the Sjellebro Camp be closed down when the number of conscientious objectors reaches its lowest point next winter. A total of 18 supervisors and salaried employees will then become unemployed. At the same time, Jutland will lose its last camp for conscientious objectors, and the Gribskov Camp in North Zealand will be the only one left.

The closing down of the camp will not proceed quietly, says the spokesman for the camp, Carl Skoubæk. "We Jutlanders are steady and level-headed, but now we have woken up," he tells BERLINGSKE AFTEN. "We have told the Civil Defense Service Board at Tåstrup that we are going to pull at our tether. For they have always been saying that conscientious objectors must be paid less and serve longer because their service is not as severe as that of soldiers. But that is not true. I know that after having taught social studies for 7 years at different barracks. The Sjellebro Camp will be sacrificed because nobody taking part in the decision-making process knows what conscientious objectors do. Not as hard a service, they say--last year, we had a team from the Sjellebro Camp at the Egmont Folk High School, helping the handicapped. I must say that that was a 24-hour job. That is never appreciated by the authorities. It is being ignored."

Carl Skoubæk finds it important retaining a camp in Jutland because conscientious objectors in Jutland will otherwise have to travel to the Gribskov Camp if they want to serve their 11 months in a camp instead of being stationed in a cultural or social institution.

PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, COMMAND OF ARMY LIGHT PLANE DIVISION

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French May 82 pp 155-156

[Text] The Personnel and the Equipment

The personnel of the ALAT [Army Light Plane Division] include today:

- 6,000 men, including 3,000 on active duty;
- 500 officers in all branches, with various qualifications: spotters-pilots, mechanics, air-traffic controllers;
- 750 noncommissioned-officer pilots;
- 1,000 noncommissioned-officer mechanics.

They operate 700 pieces of equipment:

- some 50 airplanes;
- 330 light helicopters;
- 130 antitank helicopters;
- 130 transport helicopters;
- 15 Spartiate radars.

The training of these personnel is provided by two schools:

- the Specialization School (ESALAT) at Dax, which trains the light-helicopter pilots;
- the Application School (EAALAT), at Cagnet des Maures, which trains the future flight commanders, breaks pilots in on the Puma, and gives basic and advanced training to officers and noncommissioned officers in the areas of tactical flying and operational instrument flying. This type of flying permits formation movements in bad weather conditions. The instruction makes extensive use of flight simulators. Simulators are also used for instructing the gunners trained in the school.* The school also trains the radar specialists and the Spartiate radar-station chiefs. The training of the air-traffic controllers is given at the National School of Civil Aviation.

* After 400 to 500 firings on simulators, the training is culminated by a live firing of a Hot (Fr 80,000). The RHC's [Combat Helicopters Regiments] also come to do their annual firing practice at the Canjuers camp, near the school.

In the listing of the equipment, the reader will have noted the very small place held by airplanes, which are being phased out. The helicopters are of three main types:

light helicopters:

- Alouette II;
- SA-341 Gazelle, a training machine equipped with AP-334 magnifying optics (5,000 meters); there are two 10-helicopter flights per regiment;

antitank helicopters:

- Alouette III, armed with four SS-11 missiles (range, 3,000 m);
- SA-342 Gazelle, a more high-performance aircraft than the SA-341 and armed with four Hot missiles (range, 4,000 m); each regiment has three antitank flights; there will be a total of 10 SA-342 Hot flights and six AL-III antitank flights;

transport helicopters:

- Puma SA-330's, capable of transporting 15 men or carrying a 1,500-kg load on a sling.

Articulation of the Equipment

The ALAT command is located at Villacoublay. Command is currently exercised by Major General Navereau.

Each military region has a GHL [Light-Helicopter Group] comprising some 20 light helicopters.

Each of the three army corps has:

- an Army Corps ALAT Command, which is the adviser to the army-corps command on use of the ALAT and is in liaison with the Air Force for coordination of operations;
- a GHL;
- 2 RHC's of 72 aircraft:
 - 2 light-helicopter flights
 - 3 antitank-helicopter flights
 - 2 transport-helicopter flights.

To the 1st Army Corps belong the 11th GHL (Nancy Essey), the 1st RHC (Phalsbourg) and the 3rd RHC (Etain-Rouvres). The 2nd Army Corps has the 12th GHL (Treves) and the 2nd RHC (Friedrichshafen and Fribourg).

The 3rd Army Corps has the 13th GHL (Les Mureaux) and the 6th RHC (Compiègne).

In general reserve at Pau is the 5th RHC, coupled with the 11th Parachute Division and intended for external action.

In wartime, the EAALAT sets up the 4th RHC, to reinforce the 2nd Army Corps.

The Army's application schools (Infantry, ABC [Armored Corps and Cavalry] and Artillery) each have an ALAT flight, for training officer and noncommissioned-officer cadets in air-mobility.

The ALAT also has detachments in the overseas departments and territories and in Djibouti (Alouette III's armed with SS-11's, and Pumas). In the Central African Republic and in Uganda, it has carried out humanitarian missions (transporting food and medical care to population groups).

Along the same line of considerations, the ongoing medical-assistance aid that the ALAT provides in metropolitan France, in liaison with the SAMU's [Emergency Medical Assistance Service], by doing medical evacuations, should be stressed. It also took part in rescue operations during the floods in the Garonne and Saone basins last winter.

11267

CSO: 3100/703

BRIEFS

AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOCH IN EXERCISE--An aeronaval force centered around the aircraft carrier "Foch" and under the command of VAE [Admiral] Lacoste, commander of the Mediterranean squadron, has left Toulon on a 4-week sortie. This force has a twofold mission: to manifest the presence of our forces in the western and central Mediterranean; and higher-level training in the conduct of air and sea operations in the theater, participating, in particular, with an Atlantic-squadron group under the command of CA [Rear Admiral] Lesc, in the "Distant Drum" exercise, and with the same group, in the "Tartare" national intersquadron exercise and in combined exercises with the Air Force's Tactical Air Force (FATAC). The aeronaval force includes, in addition to the "Foch"--which at the beginning of the mission is flying the ensign of CA Montpellier, commanding the carrier and aircraft group--the two missile-launching frigates "Suffren" and "Duquesne," the corvette "Dupleix," the squadron escort "Guepratte" and the oil ship "Meuse." It was reinforced, at the beginning of the sortie, by the corvette "Georges Leygues" and the squadron escort "D'Estrees" and is being supported throughout the mission by land-based patrol aircraft. From 19 to 24 May, the ships are calling at Athens ("Foch," "Duquesne," "Suffren," "Guepratte"), at Augusta and Taranto ("Meuse"), and at Rijeka in Yugoslavia ("Dupleix"). [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 15 May 82 p 18] 11267

CSO: 3100/703

SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS NUCLEAR THREAT AS DRAFT ISSUE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 82 p 48

[Text] Three Supreme Court judges accepted as grounds for exemption from further military service the defendant's statement that in a modern war, the use of nuclear weapons and chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction could lead to the extermination of mankind. The 29-year-old man refused to be part of such an extermination and in 1979 he requested exemption from further military service.

His request was approved in Bergen City Court, but a majority on the Gulathing Appeals Court did not feel he had met the conditions for exemption from military service. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where it was decided that the 29-year-old man's reasons were convincing enough to meet the requirements of the law on conscientious objectors.

All five judges upheld the city court's dismissal of the charges, saying that his convictions on refusing service were of such a nature that he could not perform any kind of military service without coming in conflict with them. It is true that the 29-year-old had said that in an extreme situation, he might consider resorting to weapons, that for example it might be justified to take the life of a single person who was killing many others, but that he would not take part in organized actions or kill on the orders of another person.

Supreme Court judges Harald Elstad and Einar Lochen found that the standpoint of the 29-year-old man had the absolute content required by the law, while three judges, Jan Skare, Kristen Syvertsen and Lilly Bolviken, went somewhat further in that they also accepted as a basis for acquittal under the law that the man's refusal to perform military service was also based on the idea that in a modern war, the use of nuclear weapons would lead to the extermination of mankind. Even though the man had made reservations, the Supreme Court majority could not see that they were of concrete interest. His convictions were based on the existence of modern mass destruction weapons and one could not place decisive weight on how he would act in a situation where this basic premise did not exist.

The 29-year-old was represented before the Supreme Court by lawyer Haakon Skaug and the Justice Ministry for the nation was represented by lawyer Arne Fliflet with the Attorney General.

BRIEFS

FRYDENLUND BACKS DEFENSE INCREASES--The chairman of the Storting Defense Committee, Knut Frydenlund, told NTB Friday that he did not believe the Conservatives will go back on their resolution to increase the defense budget by 4 percent this year. AFTENPOSTEN reported recently that the government would probably be unable to increase the defense budget for next year by the 4 percent pledged earlier, due to the bleak situation of the Norwegian economy. "I think this is just a speculation on the part of AFTENPOSTEN. I do not believe the Conservatives will go back on their decision, especially because of the emphasis the party put on this issue during the campaign and in relation to Norway's allies," said Frydenlund. "It is obvious that we are in a difficult economic situation and it will be harder to persuade people that this must not have an effect on defense. Therefore it would be wiser of the Conservatives to approve the Labor proposal of a 3-percent increase, which is also in line with the goals set up by the NATO countries," said Frydenlund. "To some extent, strengthening the conventional defenses is important in order to avoid dependence on nuclear arms. I see this question in a broader European context; among other things, it will be interesting to see if the bigger European countries will reduce appropriations for nuclear weapons and increase funding for conventional defenses," said Frydenlund. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 82 p 3]

6578

CSO: 3108/112

BRIEFS

ARIANE LAUNCH SYSTEM NEGOTIATIONS--Arianespace - Aerospatiale negotiating for purchase of materiel: These negotiations, which should conclude about mid-June and which involve the preparation of an overall contract with a value of about Fr 35 billion (in 1982 economic terms), are related to the supplying to Ariane-space of nine "Sylda" (second-generation system) double launching systems, five payload adapters, test materiel, and certain ground equipment. We mention the fact that the first Sylda system will be used in the course of the next Ariane launching, which is planned for 17 September. At that time, two satellites are to be placed in orbit: Marecs B and Sirio 2. [Text] [Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONALE in French 15-31 May 82 p 19] 11267

CSO: 3100/703

GENERAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

IMMIGRATION DECLINING, EMIGRATION INCREASING--Immigration to Sweden continues to decline. At the same time, emigration is increasing. This was indicated by information from the Central Bureau of Statistics. During the first quarter of the year 8,000 persons immigrated. This is 600 below the corresponding period in 1981. Because of the situation in Poland, 1,000 Polish citizens arrived in Sweden during the first quarter. Only 300 arrived during the same period last year. Emigration from Sweden totaled 7,150, an increase of 750. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 May 82 p 6] 9336

CSO: 3109/169

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